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James J. SADKOVICH**
Patriots and Nationalists
Asked in April 1993 what he thought of a poll by Globus which conclud-
ed that it would be “difficult” to list him “among Croatia’s patriots,” Franjo 
Tuđman replied that he considered himself a patriot (rodoljub). “Patriotism,” 
he said, “I hold as a worthy phenomenon in life, in the feelings of peoples and 
nations. It is another thing,” he added, “when it turns into chauvinism, impe-
rialism.”  But in Croatia, he continued, the chauvinistic parties had obtained 
fewer votes than elsewhere in Europe. He believed this had occurred because 
under his leadership the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica – HDZ) had projected a positive image, attracting voters across the 
ideological spectrum.1 But the Croatian President refused to concede the man-
tel of patriot to his more vociferous opponents. Some, like Zvonimir Čičak, 
a student leader during the 1970s and a human rights activist in the 1990s, 
Tuđman dismissed as unable to accept the idea of a sovereign Croatia. Others, 
he explained, opposed the new democratic order and criticized his govern-
ment because they could not accept anyone in power but themselves.2 Nor, 
many of his critics might counter, could Tuđman.3 His image of himself was 
clearly not consonant with the image others held of him.
Seeing past the image of any political leader is difficult; in Tuđman’s case, 
it is doubly so because he was branded as a radical nationalist by the Yugoslav 
regime, and he was consistently portrayed as a dangerous nationalist when he 
emerged twenty years later as the leader of the HDZ.4 Most people in public 
*I would like to thank the Woodrow Wilson Center and IREX for their support of my research 
on Franjo Tuđman, as well as Sabrina Ramet, the Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelije univer-
siteit (NTNU), and those who have commented on this paper.
**James J. Sadkovich, Ph. D., Leiden, Netherlands
1 Franjo Tuđman, Hrvatska riječ svijetu: Razgovori sa stranim predstavnicima (Zagreb: 
Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada/Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1999), p. 249.
2 Tuđman, Hrvatska riječ, p. 254–5. Čičak had just accused Croatia of ethnic cleansing in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 Stjepan Malović and Gary W. Selnow, The People, Press, and Politics of Croatia (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 2001), p. 140, quote Marvin Stone, who believes Tuđman “...has instincts that 
are....uncomfortably close to fascism. He is antidemocratic, powerful, authoritarian and...fascis-
tic.” Drago Hedl’s “Living in the Past: Franjo Tudjman’s Croatia,” Current History (March 2000), 
is a diatribe; Hedl wrote for Feral Tribune, a vociferous critic of Tuđman.
4 For example, Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia (London: Penguin/BBC 
Books, 1996), pp. 83–4, 86.
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life strive to present an image of themselves which is as carefully crafted as are 
the attacks of their critics. This was also the case with Tuđman. He published 
practically everything he wrote and left thousands of pages of writing, many 
defensive, some self-serving and disingenuous, few dispassionate, almost all 
detailed and turgid. He presented a formal figure in public, yet was prone to 
off-the-cuff remarks that seemed at best reckless. The images he projected, 
like the photographs in his 1991 biography, confuse rather than clarify.5 His 
obituaries were almost uniformly unflattering, and his magnum opus was gen-
erally ridiculed or condemned in the West.6
Politicians, statesmen, and diplomats cannot be expected to be candid, and 
journalists are as much stenographers for their sources or dramatists for their 
editors as they are critics or analysts. Yet Tuđman was extremely candid, and 
journalists seemed to feel compelled to editorialize every time they wrote 
about him. Most journalists pick up and disseminate what they hear and read, 
whether it is propaganda, rumor, or hearsay; they rarely probe the beliefs and 
histories of the participants to a conflict. But they do like to dramatize.7 This 
was certainly the case with Tuđman, whether the laudatory reports in the offi-
cial press or the vicious denunciations in both the opposition and much of 
the Western media. Both journalists and politicians tended to reduce complex 
realities to comprehensible patterns based on existing stereotypes.8 When aca-
demics and analysts act as members of the media or as partisans for a party 
or a people, this is true of their work as well. They can be as superficial, unin-
formed, and biased as any journalist writing against deadline, and during the 
5 Željko Krušelj, Franjo Tuđman. Biografija (Zagreb: Globus, 1991), for Tuđman at official 
functions, in a cardigan in his library, pruning trees in his garden, smelling a flower, and diving 
in a skimpy swimming suit. To an American eye, many of the photos are simply odd.
6 The Croatian Embassy’s obituary, www.croatiaemb.org/tudjman/biography.html, is posi-
tive, but the obituary at Teoma.com depicts Tuđman as a “ruthless dictator” who “thwarted 
democracy and suppressed any internal dissent. Miloš Vasić, “Dr. Franjo Tuđman, 1922–1999, 
www.vreme.com/arhiva_html/467/08.html, portrays Tuđman as an anti-Semite whose obses-
sion with Bosnia, his scheming with Milošević, and his efforts to rehabilitate the NDH caused 
all of Croatia’s problems. The Serbian editor dismisses the Croatian victory in 1995 as the result 
of Milošević’s decision not to support Croatia’s Serbs. For a particularly bizarre interchange, see 
the documents collected by Joe Tripician at balkansnet.org/joet-jakov.html.
7 For critiques of the media, see Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing 
Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Norman Isaacs, 
Untended Gates. The Mismanagement of the Press (Columbia UP, 1986); Martin A. Lee and 
Norman Solomon, Unreliable Sources. A Guide to Detecting Bias in News Media (New York: 
Carol Publishing Group, 1990); David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entman, Media, Power, Politics 
(New York: The Free Press, 1981); and Lawrence C. Soley, The News Shapers. The Sources Who 
Explain the News (Westport CT: Praeger, 1992).
8 Janusz Bugajski, in Raju G.C. Thomas and H. Richard Friman, The South Slav Conflict. 
History, Religion, Ethnicity, and Nationalism (New York: Garland, 1996), pp. 115–116. Some 
insist that Serbs, not Croats, were demonized, e.g., Anita Lekić, “Words as Weapons: The New 
York Times on the Yugoslav Civil War,” South East European Monitor (1996) 1(5): 12–22, and 
Peter Brock, “’Greater Serbia’ vs. the Greater Western Media,” Mediterranean Quarterly (1995) 
6 (1).
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early 1990s, many savaged Franjo Tuđman, who became the dominant symbol 
of a dangerous Croatian nationalism.9
Dismissed by academics as a loquacious amateur historian and depicted by 
the media as a nationalist and neo-fascist, Tuđman’s past as a dissident was 
forgotten and his respect for formal, procedural democracy ignored. So David 
Owen recalls Alija Izetbegović and Milovan đilas as dissidents, but he labels 
Tuđman a nationalist and an “opportunist in the cause of Croatia” who con-
ducted “diplomacy by histrionics.”10 For Ian Kearns, he was just another dan-
gerous Balkan politician, a Croatian Milošević. At best, he was an authoritar-
ian leader, not a democrat.11 The Bosnian Croat leader, Mate Boban may have 
praised the Croatian president for his realism, and Tuđman may have seen 
himself as a patriot and a democrat, but most foreign observers condemned 
him for practicing a brutal Realpolitik. Had he not died, Franjo Tuđman 
would certainly have been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as the leader of a “joint criminal enterprise” 
and taken his place in the docket alongside the former President of Serbia, 
Slobodan Milošević. Many believe that is where he belonged, not on the pages 
of Croatian textbooks as the father of his country. Yet those who knew him 
would disagree.12
So who was franjo Tuđman?
To begin to answer that question, it is first necessary to dispel the layers 
of propaganda which obscure Tuđman. As Richard Cobb, a historian of the 
French Revolution, has noted, in troubled times sorting the false from the true 
is difficult because the meaning of a word depends on who is using it, and 
9 For example, Ian Kearns, “Croatian Politics: The New Authoritarianism,” Political Quarterly 
(January-March 1996), 67 (1), EBSCO Text, pp. 2, 7, thinks “a confused analysis of the nature” 
of “the Croatian regime” led to diverse views of Tuđman’s Croatia as a victim of aggression, a 
fascist state, or the same as Serbia. He sees Croatia evolving “from war victim to warmonger,” 
with “a new edifice of authoritarian power.” He also tends to credit rumor and gossip and to 
accept the most negative explanation for an event, e.g., he notes a rumor that the HDZ had 
“moles” in opposition parties, then comments, without verifying the rumor, that the HDZ was 
“not relying on such tactics alone.” For criticism of the “complicity of the routinized academic 
community,” see Ivan Iveković in Stefano Bianchini and R. C. Nation, The Yugoslav Conflict and 
its Implications for International Relations (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998), p. 213.
10 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1995), pp. 6, 15, 36–8, 75, 78, 
who cites Rebecca West, Fitzroy Maclean, and Milovan đilas, criticized the Croats for having 
“attacked” the “Krajina” in 1995, which he believes had been Serb territory for 300 years.
11 Kearns, “Croatian Politics,” EBSCO text, p. 3, notes that Tuđman was popular, but believes 
that he was “accused rightly of an authoritarian style of leadership” because he intimidated HDZ 
deputies and appointed “friends and close colleagues” to high office.
12 Karlo Mirth, Život u emigraciji (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 2003), p. 398, recalls his thoughts 
on his last visit to pay tribute to Tuđman in Mirogoj, the cemetery outside Zagreb. “. . . nobody 
and nothing,” Mirth writes, “can change the historical significance of the fact that here lies the 
first President of Croatia.” Anđelko Mijatović, who worked closely with Tuđman, thinks that 
without him, it is “doubtful” that Croatia would exist because other politicians lacked both the 
vision and the resolve to create a Croatian state; personal interview, Zagreb, June 17, 2005.
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everyone has his own version of events, his own heroes and villains, his own 
revolution.13 And whatever else they were, after 1989 events in Croatia and the 
former Yugoslavia were certainly revolutionary. So understanding Tuđman is 
in part an exercise in deflating propaganda and the precise—historically accu-
rate—use of words.
But disentangling the true from the false is especially difficult in the case 
of the former Yugoslavia because the levels of deceit there were many and 
well-established, not only among members of the League of Communists, but 
among academics and ordinary people.14 A habit of deceit encouraged a culture 
of accommodation and self-deception in which conspiracy theories abound-
ed.15 And conspiracy theories, like all theories and models, appear valid once 
their basic premises are accepted.16 As Muhamed Filipović learned, not to col-
laborate in a system of lies and denunciations was to risk both reputation and 
livelihood. Few ran that risk, and almost everyone in the professional class was 
compromised to some extent. There were few dissidents, and they tended to 
be abroad, in prison or living as non-persons, vilified or ignored by the regime 
and its supporters.17 The politics of self-censorship and accommodation even 
seems to have extended to some academics in the West who made their careers 
analyzing and praising the peculiar system of socialist self-management cre-
13 Richard Cobb, The Police and the People. French Popular Protest, 1789-1820 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. xvi-xvi, and passim, is particularly distrustful of the police, 
who are not objective observers.
14 Instructive is the exchange at the ICTY between Stipe Mesić and Slobodan Milošević over 
whether Vice Vukojević, an HDZ deputy in the Sabor, had been photographed in an HVO uni-
form and whether he was guilty of war crimes. Milošević insisted he was; Mesić noted that 
Vukojević was from Bosnia and that he could not have committed the crimes of which he was 
accused because he was elsewhere at the time they occurred. ICTY, Milošević Trial, October 
2, 2002, p. 10687. Malović and Selnow, The People, Press, and Politics of Croatia, pp. 62–3, 111, 
note most journalists served local political parties and few dissidents existed under commu-
nism; most people went along to get along, censoring themselves to avoid antagonizing the 
party.
15 United Nations, CAT Committee Report, May 6, 1996, noted that one of the problems con-
fronting Croatia was the distortion of “social attitudes’ after forty-five years of communism. 
Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks: diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata, 1990–1997 (Zagreb: 
Nakladni zavod Globus, 2000), p. 110, notes the ubiquity of conspiracy theories, including the 
conviction that Croatia would be sacrificed to preserve Yugoslavia.
16 For competing “paradigms” in the physical and the social sciences, see Thomas S. Kuhn, 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), passim. 
Also see “Are They a) Geniuses or b) Jokers?” New York Times, November 9, 2002, which cites 
Dr. Peter Waif and other physicists who note that competing models can be equally valid and 
that much of the literature in contemporary physics is “complete nonsense,” with interdisciplin-
ary misunderstanding and unintelligible papers common. 
17 Muhamed Filipović, Pokušaj jedne duhovne biografije (Sarajevo: Avicena, 1999), p. 134, 
recalls a colleague who attacked him to save his own job. Filipović deplored a system in which 
people made careers by lying for others, lying to the public, and lying to themselves. Zlatko 
Anguelov, Confessions of an Innocent Victimizer (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 
2002), passim, notes the paucity of dissidents in Bulgaria and describes the process by which he 
was ultimately compromised.
251
Review of Croatian History 2/2006, no.1, 247 - 280
ated by the former communist conspirators and wartime Partisans, Josip Broz 
Tito and Edvard Kardelj.18
Among the most vociferous opponents of both Tuđman and his collabora-
tors were those on the Left who had viewed Tito’s nonaligned movement as a 
viable option to the USSR and China. Among the American publications, The 
Nation, The Progressive, and Harper’s all took positions which were critical of 
Tuđman and his government.19 Some opposed Croatian nationalism on prin-
ciple, as a recrudescence of twentieth-century fascism, including some Serbian 
intellectuals associated with the Zagreb journal Praxis.20 Others seemed to have 
a visceral hatred for both Tuđman and Croatia.21 Tuđman’s opponents includ-
ed Leftists like Eric Hobsbawm, whose distrust of small peoples influenced 
many intellectuals during the 1990s; liberals like Ivo Banac, one of Tuđman’s 
most incisive critics; and The Economist, which, like Hobsbawm, suggested 
that self-determination should be reserved for large nations—a point of view 
diametrically opposed to Tuđman’s insistence that small peoples also should 
be allowed their own states.22
18 Reneo Lukić and Allen Lynch, Europe from the Balkans to the Urals. The Disintegration 
of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 244–5. The problem 
existed for Sovietologists as well; see Stephen F. Cohen, Rethinking the Soviet Experience. Politics 
and History since 1917 (New York: Oxford UP, 1986), passim.
19 For example, Chris Hedges,“Planning Croatia’s Final Solution,” Harper’s, December 2001, 
who claims that 600,000 Serbs were “driven from the Krajina region” in 1995 and “up to 400 
Serb civilians” killed by the HV in Gospić. Hedges was introducing the minutes of two meet-
ings of the Croatian Council for Defense and National Security held in September 1993. For 
a fuller discussion of bias in the American media, see James J. Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and 
Yugoslavia, 1991-1995 (Westport CT: Greenwood, 1998), passim.
20 Christopher Hitchens, Alexander Cockburn, Eric Hobsbawm, and Bogdan Denitch were 
particularly influential on the Left. See, for example, Christopher Hitchens, “Minority Report,” 
Nation, March 29, 1993, and October 25 and November 20 and 25, 1995, and Alexander 
Cockburn, “Beat the Devil,” The Nation, 31 Aug.-7 Sept. 1992. Also see Aleksa Djilas, “The 
Nation That Wasn’t,” New Republic, 21 September 1993, and Misha Glenny, “The Massacre of 
Yugoslavia,” New York Review of Books, 30 January 1992, “The Revenger’s Tragedy,” New York 
Review of Books, 13 August 1992, and “Yugoslavia: The Great Fall,” New York Review of Books, 
23 March 1995. 
21 For example, Justus Leicht and Peter Schwarz, World Socialist Web Site, 16 December 1999, 
who condemn Tuđman as “a nationalist, a racist and anti-Semite” who “drove” 400,000 [sic] Serbs 
out of Croatia, “glorified the medieval roots of the Croatian nation and “trivialized the atroci-
ties of the fascist Ustasha” who “cruelly murdered” “up to 800,000 Serbs, Jews, Roma and anti-
fascists” at Jasenovac where Tuđman purportedly claimed only 30,000 had died. They accused 
him of having supported “notorious war criminals” in Bosnia and possessing “all the negative 
characteristics—and a few more” of Milošević, making him an “ideal partner” for Germany and 
the United States, since he was a creature of the German secret service and guilty of aggression 
against both Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia, and responsible for “pervasive corruption and nep-
otism” in Croatia. Paul Mitchell, World Socialist Web Site, March 27, 2002, claims Tuđman was 
“an advocate of ethnic cleansing” and “an admirer of the Ustashe Nazi collaborators.”
22 Eric Hobsbawm, “The Perils of the New Nationalism,” The Nation, November 4, 1991, 
argues that self-determination for small nations is impractical, “as Kuwait and Croatia show.” 
He sees Eastern Europeans embracing nationalism because they are insecure and disorient-
ed and in search of “simple, intuitively comprehensible beliefs that substitute for less under-
standable political programs.” Ivo Banac, Protiv straha. Članci, izjave i javni nastupi, 1987-
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The Left’s position was not born only of support for Tito’s regime or Marxist 
disdain for peasants and populists; the Left had a tradition of attacking Croatia 
and Croatians. Marx and Engels had laid considerable blame for the failure of 
the revolutions of 1848 on the Croats, and Rebecca West found ways to blame 
the Croats for the repression exercised by King Alexander’s dictatorship dur-
ing the 1930s.23 In the 1970s, commentators sympathetic to the Prague Spring, 
either ignored the Croatian Spring or portrayed it as an ugly eruption of ret-
rograde nationalism.24 When information conflicted with conventional wis-
dom, it tended to be ignored or explained away, so much so that the ICTY has 
labeled Tuđman the “leader” of a “criminal enterprise” because he supported 
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina against both Serbs and Muslims during the 
early 1990s.25 The accusation is a sad irony; in early 1993, Tuđman, along with 
other Croatian leaders, had pressed for the creation of an international court 
to try war crimes, and during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, his gov-
ernment sheltered Muslim refugees not welcome in the West and helped to 
funnel weapons to the armed forces of the neighboring state.26
1992 (Zagreb: Slon, 1992), pp. 119–20, and Why Bosnia?, p. 154, rejected Hobsbawm’s asser-
tion that the nationalist era was past as poorly informed and characterized his new book as 
“blindly polemical, semantically flawed and full of factual errors.” (“Hobsbawmova je knjiga 
do te mjere slijepo polemična, semantički nedomišljena i puna činjeničkih grešaka.”) Banac also 
considered the work of Anthony Smith and Ernest Gellner to be incomplete.  Davorin Rudolf, 
Rat koji nismo htjeli. Hrvatska 1991 (Zagreb: Globus, 1999), p. 327, notes that UN members 
include sixteen nations smaller than Croatia, and The Economist, June 29, 1991, writes, “The 
idea of self-determination applies to Croats and Slovenes as much as to Estonian, Latvians, and 
Lithuanians.” Noting that Luxembourg is a fifth the size of Slovenia, it concludes that, “small 
does not mean unrecognizable. . . .”
23 For Marx and Engels, see Diane Paul, “In the Interests of Civilization: Marxist Views of 
Race and Culture in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of the History of Ideas (1981) 42(1): 115-
38, and Franjo Tuđman, Velike ideje i mali narodi. Rasprave i ogledi (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 
1970), passim. Unlike Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon. A Journey through Yugoslavia 
(New York: Viking, 1941/53), passim, Karl Lowenstein, “Autocracy Versus Democracy in 
Contemporary Europe,” American Political Science Review, 29 (August 1935) 4: 571–93, saw 
Alexander’s regime as one of several autocratic, fascist regimes.
24 Vladimir V. Kusin, “An Overview of East European Reformism,” Soviet Studies, 28 (July 
1976) 3: 338–61, discusses the Prague Spring, but ignores the Croatian Spring; instead, he 
describes reforms in 1958 and self-management. Gale Stokes, ed., From Stalinism to Pluralism. 
A Documentary History of Eastern Europe since 1945 (New York: Oxford, 1991), pp. 6, 95 ff., 115 
ff., 224 ff., includes readings on the Prague Spring and Poland’s Solidarity movement; Yugoslav 
self-management and its “new class”; Serbian nationalism; and the Praxis group, which was 
anti-Croatian and pro-Yugoslav. Two of the three readings in the sections on self-manage-
ment and the “new class” are by the Montenegrin, Milovan đilas, and one of three readings on 
nationalism is by “a Belgrade lawyer,” Veljko Guberina. The section on the Praxis group is by “a 
Belgrade philosopher,” Mihailo Marković, who focuses on events in Belgrade; lists the creation 
of Serbian and Yugoslav associations in “all the other republics”; and notes that Praxis, although 
published by the Croatian Philosophical Society of Zagreb from 1964 to 1974, was edited by a 
“group of Yugoslav philosopher” (Gajo Petrović, Rudi Supek, and Danilo Pejović). For a criti-
cal discussion, see Stanko M. Vujica, “The Humanist Marxism in Croatia,” Journal of Croatian 
Studies (1968–1969), pp. 3–40.
25 ICTY, Indictment of Jadranko Prlić, et al., Paragraph 36.
26 Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 373, for Tuđman’s attitude toward the Tribunal, which was estab-
lished by UN Resolution 808 of February 22, 1993. For the creation of the ICTY, see Pierre 
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Yet in 1991, Western observers chided Tuđman and his government for 
provoking Croatia’s Serbs, and in 1993, pundits, academics, and politicians in 
the West accused the Croatian army of vicious attacks on Bosnia’s Muslims.27 
Many Western scholars, both radical and conservative, followed the lead of 
their Yugoslav counterparts and constructed a negative image of Croatians 
and Croatian leaders.28 A recent analysis uses the jargon of anthropology and 
literary criticism to argue that the Croatians “constructed” a state, then justi-
fied it by “elevating” a “regional dialect” to the status of a language and dis-
tancing themselves from their Serbian cousins by constructing the Serb as 
“the Balkan other.”29 It is an interesting gambit, but it is only a gambit, which 
ignores the persistence of Croatian culture over centuries and the practical 
exercise of many aspects of a sovereign state by Croatian institutions prior to 
1918. Like many literary arguments, it is historically naive. But both histori-
ans and social scientists fell into the trap of confusing abstractions with reality, 
seduced by theories and enchanted by models, including the biggest theoreti-
cal model of all—Yugoslavia itself.30 As Lukić and Lynch note, “entire careers” 
had been built by singing the praises of Yugoslavia.31 And Tuđman was tear-
ing it down.
Hazan, Justice in a Time of War. The true story behind the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004).
27 For Tuđman’s views, Hrvatska riječ, pp. 22–3. Banac, Protiv straha, p. 209, lists , and rejects, 
some of the charges against the Croats, which included their past as “mercenaries,” their role 
in the suppression of the revolutions of 1848, their opposition to the Versailles order, their 
Germanophilia, and their support for the Ustaša.
28 Banac, Protiv straha, pp. 223–5 and passim, thinks Croatian emigrants “failed” to create 
the institutions and university chairs needed to write and disseminate a Croatian version of 
Croatian and Yugoslav history. He sees a need to write new histories, believes Yugoslav histori-
ography needs a “large injection of independent thinking” (velika injekcija slobodoumlja) and 
praises Dušan Bilandžić as one of the few historians who have tried to write honestly. Dušan 
Bilandžić, Propast Jugoslavije i stvaranje moderne Hrvatske. Eseji, članci, interviewi, analize, 
izvješća, izjave (Zagreb: AGM, 2001), pp. 306–307, urges a general revision of the historiogra-
phy on Yugoslavia, which he believes prejudiced the French and British against Croatia.
29 Nick Ceh and Jeff Harder, “Imagining the Croatian Nation,” East European Quarterly 
(January 2005), pp. 409–416, base their analysis of Croatian “constructions” on 25 hours of 
interviews, but the authors never examine the reality of the “constructs.” Ceh and Harder seem 
to be unaware that by arguing for language as the primary marker of nationality, they are in 
effect repeating the arguments of Vuk Karadžić, the father of modern Serbian nationalism.
30 Robin Okey, “Central Europe/Eastern Europe: Behind the Definitions,” Past and Present 37 
(November 1992), p. 131, notes, in a slightly different context, that value-based discussions in 
which concepts trump reality are normal.
31 Lukić and Lynch, Europe from the Balkans, pp. 244–5, and Christopher Cviić, “Perceptions 
of Former Yugoslavia: An Interpretive Reflection,” International Affairs 71 (4) (1995): 824–26. 
Where journalists and scholars did their research and where they were based influenced their 
views, e.g., Christopher Bennett and Mark Thompson were in Slovenia and tended to be critical 
of both Serbs and Croats, but not of Slovenes; Silber and Little were in Belgrade and tended to 
echo official sources, who were sympathetic to Serbia and hostile to Croatia and Slovenia. Susan 
Woodward and Norman Cigar were both in Washington, D.C. Woodward blamed the West 
and structural factors for Yugoslavia’s violent breakup; Cigar was critical of the JNA, Milošević, 
Belgrade’s “orientalists,” and Serbian Orthodox leaders.
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The Indispensable Villain
By the time Tuđman came on stage in Yugoslavia, the sets had been care-
fully arranged and the role he was to play had been written by others, includ-
ing Westerners whose major bias was a tendency to view the rest of the world 
as an imperfect realization of their own societies.32 The American media wrote 
about Tuđman, but they rarely talked with his collaborators. Instead, they con-
versed with his enemies and consulted old Yugoslav hands, like the American 
diplomats Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger, or instant experts like 
the British commanders of UN forces in Bosnia, Lewis MacKenzie, Robert 
Stewart, and Michael Rose.33 Members of the informed public read journal-
ists like Robert Kaplan, whose Balkan Ghosts influenced world leaders like 
Bill Clinton, and they sought out accessible writers like Rebecca West, rec-
ommended by The Nation as the indispensable work on Yugoslavia. In 
effect, Westerners suffered from a severe case of group think, a phenomenon 
described by Irvin Janis in the early 1970s, but still useful for understanding 
why individuals give unanimity priority over realistic appraisals of an individ-
ual or an event. Indeed, academics, journalists, and experts seemed to present 
textbook cases of the phenomenon; they sought security in consensus, reject-
ed criticism from outsiders, and shaped information to fit their paradigms and 
their collective internalized maps. Whether doing so allowed them to reach 
“premature cognitive closure,” it certainly made it easier to meet their dead-
lines and get published in academic journals.34 Preconception, prejudice, and 
convention trumped research, objectivity, and reality, as models and method 
overwhelmed fact.35 Chronology became pliable, extrapolation tainted analy-
sis, and assertion replaced interpretation. As Brendan Simms notes, experts, 
32 Stjepan Meštrović, Slaven Letica, Miroslav Goreta, Habits of the Balkan Heart. Social 
Character and the Fall of Communism (College Station TX: Texas A & M UP, 1993), pp. 46–7.
33 Timothy Sanz, “The Yugoslav Conflict; Review of the Literature,” European Security 
(Autumn 1992), pp. 427–41, shows the variety of sources when he groups Nora Beloff, who was 
pro-Serbian, and Slavenka Drakulić, a radically chic opponent of Tuđman, in an analytic section 
with a political commentator, Janusz Bugajski; three journalists, Misha Glenny, Robert Kaplan, 
and Branka Magaš; and two scholars, James Gow and Reneo Lukić.
34 Irving Lester Janis, Victims of Groupthink. A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions 
and Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 3–12, and Norman Cigar, “Norman Cigar, 
“Paradigms and U.S. Policymaking for Bosnia (1992–1995),” in Francis R. Jones and Ivan 
Lovrenović, eds., Reconstruction and Deconstruction (Sarajevo: Forum Bosnae, 2002), esp. 
pp. 59, 62–4, for Kuhn, Sandole, and Jervis on paradigms and related theories, the influence 
of Kaplan and West, and passim, for the damage preconceptions cause. Robert H. Mnookin 
and Lee Ross, “Introduction,” in Kenneth J. Arrow, et al., Barriers to Conflict Resolution (New 
York: Norton, 1995), pp. 17–18, for the correlation between groupthink and overconfidence. 
John N. Warfield, “Complexity and Cognitive Equilibrium: Experimental Results and Their 
Implications,” in Dennis J. D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, Conflict Resolution theory and 
practice. Integration and application (Manchester UP, 1993), p. 70, sees consensus via group-
think as fragile.
35 For an example of a model-driven analysis, see Keith Webb, Vassiliki Koutrakou, and 
Mike Walters, “The Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model: A 
Critical Perspective,” in Kenneth J. Arrow, R. H. Mnookin, L Jacob Bercovitch, eds., Resolving 
International Conflicts. The Theory and Practice of Mediation (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996).
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including academics, “inevitably become part of the official culture”—“too 
caught up in official ‘group-think’ to break ranks” and “fearful of giving 
offence, and thus losing influence,” to proffer “sound analysis.”36 Sycophancy, 
group think, bias, stereotypes, and off-the-cuff scholarship made for extraor-
dinarily muddy thinking, not just about the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
but about Franjo Tuđman and contemporary Croatia as well.
Just as Croatia became the necessary aggressor to relieve Serbia of sole guilt 
for the wars, Tuđman became a necessary excuse for the failures of the West, 
the indispensable, if somewhat dim, corollary to Milošević.37  Tuđman became 
the mandatory trickster in the narrative of Yugoslavia’s destruction, the expla-
nation of the evil, accidental and intentional, random and planned, which was 
unleashed in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and 1995.38 Yet, 
as Slaven Letica notes, if Tuđman was guilty of leading a “criminal conspira-
cy,” then Stipe Mesić and his collaborators from 1990 through 1994 must be as 
well, and the Croatian state itself can be dismissed as the illegitimate creation 
of criminals.39 This, of course, is not possible, so like a scapegoat, Tuđman car-
ried the sins of others as well as his own.40 To paraphrase Voltaire, had he not 
existed, it would have been necessary to invent him.
Tuđman must be guilty, because, as Misha Glenny argued, the Serbs were 
not evil and could not possibly have caused all this havoc on their own; they 
must have had a Croatian accomplice.41 The West certainly could not be criti-
36 Brendan Simms, Unfinest Hour. Britainn and the Destruction of Bosnia (London: Penguin, 
2002), pp. 252 and 223–72, for critiques of Misha Glenny, James Gow, Jonathan Eyal, John 
Zametica, John Keegan, and others who influenced public opinion and official policy.
37 Slaven Letica, Strašni sud: kronika hrvatske apokalipse (Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 
2002), pp. 165–9, 175, for Croatia as the necessary aggressor. Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard 
War. The War in the Balkans (Toronto: Mandarin, 1994), p. 391, is typical in believing that 
Milošević “always out-smarted” Tuđman.
38 The pairing of the Tuđman and Milošević and of Croat and Serb, was commonplace, e.g., 
William Pfaff, “The Shame of Bosnia,” New York Review of Books September 24, 1992, blames 
the war in Bosnia on both Serbs and Croats who “expand” by “aggressive war, conquest,” and 
“religious-purge and murder.” Ivo Banac, Raspad Jugoslavije. Eseji o nacionalizmu i nacionalin-
im sukobima (Zagreb: Durieux, 2001), pp. 121–2, 145, would have preferred Tuđman to include 
Serbs in a “civil society” rather than provoke them through the use of Croatian symbols and 
purges of the police and the bureaucracy. But while doing so might have disarmed Croatian 
nationalism and strengthened the legitimacy of Croatian indepedence, Banac believes that 
“not even such a politic by Zagreb would have deterred Milošević. “ (“Doduše, ni takva politika 
Zagreba ne bi zadržala Miloševića.”)
39 Letica, Strašni sud, pp. 165–9.
40 Rudolf, Rat koji nismo htjeli, pp. 19–35, 28–9, notes that everyone has their favorite scape-
goats, but that most blamed Tuđman, and occasionally Milan Kučan, for triggering the war.
41 Glenny, “The Massacre of Yugoslavia,” p. 30, blames Tuđman for provoking Croatia’s Serbs 
who “make up between 12 and 20 percent of Croatia’s population,” and in “Yugoslavia: The 
Great Fall,” pp. 38–41, 56–63, he argues that “to accept the war as being exclusively a matter of 
Serb aggression, one has to show that Bosnia-Herzegovina was a stable, established state, and 
it was not”; he claims that only three things grow in Herzegovina, “stones, snakes, and usta-
shas”; he believes Tuđman and Milošević struck a deal at Karađorđevo; and he thinks “Serbs 
and Croats have found it impossible. . .to overcome the desire to exterminate one another. . .”
256
J. J. SADKOVICH, Patriots, Villains, and Franjo Tuđman
cized for the carnage in Yugoslavia; its humanitarian credentials were in order. 
Nor could Tito and self-management be blamed, save by Serbian nationalists 
bitter at their slightly diminished role in his Yugoslavia. For many in both the 
West and Yugoslavia, the supranational, self-managed Yugoslav state and its 
policy of nonalignment were attractive options to reactionary nationalism and 
totalitarian communism. So critics of Yugoslavia, including Tuđman, must in 
some basic way be flawed, and condemning “separatist” nationalism became 
a necessary corollary to supporting what was generally viewed as a basically 
humane communist regime with an innovative ideology.
Joseph Rothschild, whose books on Eastern Europe have been standard 
reading in many university classrooms, reflected a consensus among American 
scholars. Croats, he wrote, had “an almost morbid distrust of governments and 
of power per se,” and they placed “a high value” on “defensive obstruction-
ism.” His bias is apparent in his view of Croatia’s most influential politician, 
Stjepan Radić, who led the Croatian Peasant Party until June, 1928, when a 
Montenegrin who was close to the Serbian Court and a protegee of the Serbian 
politician Nikola Pašić, shot Radić, who died of his wounds in early August.42 
The Croatian politician, Rothschild writes, was “an erratic tactician and sterile 
strategist who generally opted for the politics of abstention, boycott, and with-
drawal.” Worse, his behavior was tolerated by other Croatians, who “consistent-
ly lionized him for articulating their frustrated rages.” Suggesting that “only” 
Serbs were fit to rule Yugoslavia, the American academic concludes that King 
Alexander’s imposition of a dictatorship was necessary. If the Serbian king’s 
“political instincts” were “authoritarian and manipulative,” Rothschild believes 
he was “personally courageous and even gallant,” and “motivated by the high 
ideal of Yugoslav unity.”43
 42 Stjepan Radić considered the King personally responsible for the shootings, which killed 
two Peasant Party leaders and fatally wounded him; see his Deposition, July 24, 1928, attached 
to the Italian consul in Zagreb’s telegram of August 24, 1928, Archio Storico del Ministero degli 
Affari Esteri, Folder Jugoslavia 1928, Envelope 1341.  Also see Zvonomir Kulundžić, Atentat na 
Stjepana Radića. (Zagreb: Stvarnost, 1967).
43 Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 1977), pp. 207, 212, 246–7, is in a tradition which includes Lowenstein, 
“Autocracy Versus Democracy,” p. 585, who believed Alexander sought to preserve Yugoslavia’s 
“national integration,” and J. B. Hoptner, Yugoslavia in Crisis, 1934-1941 (New York: Columbia 
UP, 1962), pp. 7, 9, who compared Radić unfavorably to Pašić, because the Serb politician 
“recognized the need for compromise,” but the Croat “seems to have wanted all or nothing.” 
Hoptner rationalized Alexander’s dictatorship as permitting “a consistent foreign policy.” 
John Lampe, Yugoslavia as History. Twice There Was a Country (Cambridge University Press, 
2000), pp. xv–xvi, 5, 161–73, suggests that Radić’s assassination was the work of a single per-
son, even though Serbian politicians and journalists had called for Radić’s death. Lampe depicts 
Alexander’s dictatorship as a necessary expedient and even a reformist regime with “creative” 
energies. Lampe was trained by Michael Petrovich and Fred Singleton, both strong support-
ers of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and he considers Milorad Ekmečić, whom Ivo Banac criticizes 
for espousing “false history,” a “respected Sarajevo historian.” Even the recent political study 
of Radić by Mark Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croatian Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass 
Mobilization (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), provides a partial correction to ear-
lier stereotypes of the Peasant Party leader.   Also see James J. Sadkovich, “Stjepan Radić, the 
Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904–1928, by Mark Biondich,” 
Journal of Croatian Studies (2002).
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Leaving aside the question of whether an integralist Yugoslav “nationalism” 
was a high ideal, it follows that if Serbs and their King were motivated by high 
ideals, then their main antagonists, the Croats, even the martyred Radić, must 
have been moved by baser convictions. If not, why did he and other Croats 
oppose the well-meaning Serbs? Tuđman was not unique. Ban Josip Jelačić, 
the bane of Hungarian liberals; Stjepan Radić, the erratic populist; and Ante 
Pavelić, the ultra-nationalist leader of the Ustaša—all were lumped together 
by American and British writers and scholars as an undifferentiated, errat-
ic, authoritarian, reactionary, nationalist conspiracy of villains, incompetents, 
and ne’er-do-wells. Croatian leaders, like Croatia and Croats in general, had 
suffered a negative image abroad for a very long time before Tuđman became 
the country’s president in 1989.
A Provincial Anachronism
Even at his best, Tuđman was old-fashioned, an anachronism, both formal 
and distant. As the leader of Croatia, he sought to set an example for other 
small states, as Tito had during the Cold War, when he and Nehru had formed 
non-aligned movement, which was then a welcome relief from the politics of 
mutually assured destruction. But Tuđman was president of Croatia during 
the 1990s, an era of multi-cultural civil societies and the mandatory and ubiq-
uitous free market.44 Mario Nobilo considered him the antithesis of the post-
modern politician; his stiff style and historical allusions seemed pretentious, 
the stuff of an earlier period of history.45 Mate Granić, his Foreign Minister, 
saw Tuđman as “a politician of the old mold,” who saw demands that his gov-
ernment guarantee human rights as at least in part an effort to put pressure on 
Croatia.46
From his writings and his public appearances, it appears that Tuđman strove 
to leave an impression of a cultured individual conscious of his historical mis-
sion, a posture which John Kennedy or Richard Nixon might have grasped, 
but which befuddled the statesmen and politicians of the 1990s. Although he 
tried mightily to convince the international community that he did not desire 
war and was prepared to compromise and collaborate with international ini-
tiatives, Tuđman appeared to most a provincial politician, mired in histori-
cism, stubbornly defending his views, humorless, authoritarian, and danger-
44 Or an era which paid lip-service to these ideals. Pavao Pavličić, Lament over Europe (Trans., 
Nikolina Jovanović) (Zagreb: Most, 1994), pp. 14, 18–20, 23–5, 29–30, 53–7, accuses Western 
Europe of being callous, committing sins of omission, being guilty of hypocrisy, and offering 
“truisms” about tolerance, democracy and minority rights while casting South Slavs as “less 
human than they are” and blaming the victims for their plight. “Their nationalism,” he com-
plains, “is considered natural and indisputable, ours twisted, perverse and dangerous.”
45 Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 109.
46 Mate Granić, Vanjski poslovi. Iza kulisa politike (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2005), p. 82.  Interview 
with Mate Granić, June 24, 2005, Kameniti stol.  Granić believes Tuđman was too open and too 
frank to be a truly good diplomat, always the historian first, the statesman second. But Granić 
considered his courageous and if autocratic, not a dictator, and he thinks that Tuđman’s col-
leagues wanted a strong leader, while Tuđman did not like strong personalities around him.
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ous. He was the quintessential negation of postmodern man. How completely 
he played the role of archaic intellectual is clear in his prose, which recalls the 
conceit of the Baroque, and in his prison diaries, which include conversations 
with authors he was reading, self-conscious introspection, and grand philo-
sophical speculation.46 Hardly the sort of thing Bush senior would write, cer-
tainly not the simple prose of Bush junior, and far from Clinton’s folksy man-
ner or Reagan’s nonchalant absent-mindedness. Americans did not need to 
construct Tuđman as the Balkan other; he did it for them.48
When he first saw Tuđman at a conference in Munich in 1990, Nenad 
Ivanković was not impressed. If energetic, the Croatian leader was also long-
winded and old-fashioned, hardly the ideal contemporary politician. That 
he could be consumed by anger was not an advantage, and his stubbornness 
could be either virtue or vice. Always a loner, in his later years Tuđman with-
drew into himself. But when in a good mood, Ivanković found that the former 
dissident could be amiable, quite unlike the stereotype created by the media. 
Pompous and overbearing, the Croatian president could also be gracious, as 
the master of the house should be with his guests.49 But he was also demand-
ing, like a prince with his courtesans. He tended to lecture associates, journal-
ists, and diplomats, and he cajoled and dunned his collaborators and subordi-
nates to provide precise information and to perform their jobs well.50 Tuđman 
47 Franjo Tuđman, Petrinjska 18. Zatvorski dnevnik iz 1972 (Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P., 2003), pp. 
26, 49–50. “This year,” he writes, “I turn fifty. I do not yet for a second feel myself old, still I 
always seek solitude, and I would like to finish writing my major scholarly work. Will I be able to 
do so? Will I have the strength of body and mind to manage it.” In his first days of confinement, 
Tuđman read Kafka’s The Trial, a choice that seems both fortuitous and contrived. Why, he won-
dered, was he in jail? “Only because I am a Croat,” he answered, “who sought to be a Croatian 
revolutionary in his youth and a Croatian historian in his mature years. What now?” Stjepan 
Radić also wrote prison memoirs, Uzničke uspomene (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1971).
48 Interview with Bob Hand, United States Helsinki Commission, Washington, D.C., 2004. 
Hand noted that Tuđman had liked pomp and circumstance and had a very formal manner, 
while Milosevic was friendly and open.  While Tudman always had answers ready and read long 
introductory statements, which Hand likened to monologues, Milosevic was informal and had 
an open, friendly style.  Both men understood English, but while the Serb leader used it to con-
verse with visitors, Tudman used a translator and responded in Croatian.  Hand thinks he did so 
because it gave him time to think.
49 Nenad Ivanković, Predsjedniče, što je ostalo? (Zagreb: Naklada P.I.P. Pavličić, 2000), p. 10–
11, 19–21, and 41, for Tuđman’s tendency to maintain his distance from everybody. Ivanković 
describes Tuđman lunch-time ritual which he scrupulously observed and used to get informa-
tion from his collaborators and satisfy his need for company. Ivanković recalls Tuđman as a “vrlo 
usamljen čovjek” who kept a “gospodska” distance from others, making it difficult to approach 
him and impossible to become truly close to him. Yet Ivanković believes he values people, even if 
he was not a good judge of character.
50 For example, Lucić, Stenogrami, Vol. I, p. 216, and passim, for his comment to Miljenko Brkić 
that he wanted the Bosnian Croat’s opinion, and his repeated efforts to get his associates to perform 
at a high level. Conversation with Slobodan Lang, Zagreb, May 28, 2005. Lang described Tuđman’s 
management style as controlled; he would consult with a number of groups on a given question, 
each tasked to discuss a particular aspect of the problem. Rather than free-wheeling discussions, 
he asked each member of a group their opinion in turn, usually withholding his approval or disap-
proval and often reaching a decision later by himself . The transcripts in Stenogrami confirm Lang’s 
observations in part; depending on the question, Tuđman could allow very open discussions and 
he would regularly reach conclusions while with the group; he tended to play the role of facilitator 
and chair, keeping participants focused and soliciting information.
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was both very “precise” (točan) and a hard worker, who was always prepared 
for meetings.  He believed that he had a historic task to help defend Croatia, 
and there is a concensus among those who worked closely with him that he 
was the key to the creation of Croatia.51
Tuđman was already an old man in 1991, his character formed in another 
era. But he was also a wounded man; defamed and denigrated for much of his 
adult life, he viewed the world as a hard place full of weak people and sudden, 
unexpected misfortune.52 He appears to have been a poor judge of charac-
ter who sometimes chose his collaborators badly. Or perhaps he was simply a 
hard-nosed realist who understood that only saints are not in some way flawed. 
In either event, he kept people around him whom he did not trust and did not 
like, and he turned a blind eye to double-dealing and dirty deals. Lacking a 
group of trusted confidants, the Croatian leader used people, deploying them 
like pieces on a chess board for the benefit of Croatia, a fitting metaphor for 
the leader of a country whose coat-of-arms was a white and red checkered 
field. Whether, as his former adviser Slaven Letica concluded, Tuđman’s per-
sonality and style were suited to the task of creating a state is debatable, but 
certainly possible. Letica considered Tuđman obsessive and narcissistic, useful 
traits in war, but damaging to democracy. While he welcomed everyone into 
his tent, the Croatian leader insisted they obey him once they were inside.53 
That his virtues were also vices that eventually eroded morale in the HDZ and 
alienated Western politicians and journalists seems indisputable.54
If not a cynic, Tuđman was not quite a realist. At one point, he considered 
himself an “optimistic realist” and a “realistic optimist.” 55 He professed to 
believe that in politics only interests count, a lesson undoubtedly driven home 
51  Interview with Zdravko Tomac, Zagreb, June 1, 2005.  Like many Croats, Tomac is upset 
with efforts to “criminalize” both Croatia’s late President and the Homeland War; see his 
Predsjednik.  Protiv krivotvorina i zaborava (Zagreb: Slovo, 2004), esp. pp. 13–20, 287–300.
52 Tuđman, Petrinjska 18, pp.42, 44, 47, noted that he had real friends and those who pretend-
ed to be friends. So it was best not to expect help nor fear betrayal by others, but to do what one 
can on one’s own. The human condition, he wrote, consists in the sudden blow, senseless and 
unexpected, which one cannot escape no matter how one tries to do so.
53 Letica, Strašni sud, pp. 360–3, 367, concludes that Tuđman “was not such a bad presi-
dent...as one might think.”  Interview with Anđelko Mijatović, Zagreb, June 17, 2005.  Mijatović 
notes that while Tuđman has been saddled with the image of a dictator, he does not prove to 
be one if one takes the time to look at what he said, wrote, and did.  Zdravka Bušić, who man-
aged Tuđman’s office, considered him a considerate but meticulous man, who worked hard and 
expected his colleagues to do so as well.  Interview, Zagreb, June 20, 2005.
54  Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 108, notes that journalists disliked Tuđman because he was 
“mračnan, srdit i nemodernan sa svojim zagrižem historicizmom.” Ivanković, Predsjedniče, pp. 
22–4, and 31, for Tuđman’s pride and stubbornness. Echoing Radić’s phrase, Ivanković saw him 
as “pokvarene inteligencije” (deformed intelligentsia). Letica, Strašni sud, p. 362, criticizes those 
who shaped opinion in the West for their poor judgment regarding “acceptable” post-com-
munist leaders. Darko Hudelist, Tuđman: Biografija (Zagreb: Profil, 2004), p. 503, and passim, 
tends to view Tuđman as a conflicted personality whose nationalism drove him to poor person-
al and policy choices, but quotes Gojko Borić, a Croatian emigrant in West Germany, who con-
sidered Tuđman a “wise, reserved and cultured man” (mudra, suzdržana i blaga čovjeka).
55 Tuđman, Petrinjska 18, pp. 38–41.
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during his years as a non-person in Yugoslavia. But he combined a romantic 
naiveté with a seemingly hard-nosed approach to politics. So while he believed 
that Germany recognized the fledgling Croatian state to serve its own concrete 
interests, not to honor abstract moral principles, he hoped for much more 
from the Germans.56 London’s Economist disingenuously discerned a link 
between Croatia and Germany, and reminded its readers that Nazi Germany 
and Croatia were once allies by running “Hail, Croatia” as its headline for a 
piece on German pressure to recognize Croatia in December 1991.57 The mes-
sage was clear; Tuđman was something other than a democrat. Others have 
taken an equally skeptical view of Tuđman’s policies and see his democratic 
pretensions as a sham and his support of Sarajevo as a cover for political pen-
etration and eventual annexation of Herzegovina.58
Again, separating reality and rumor is difficult. Propaganda was a staple of 
the media in all of the Yugoslav successor states, just as poorly informed and 
superficial analyses shaped the policies of the major powers. Sadly for Tuđman 
and Croatia, they lost the propaganda war to Croatia’s Serbs in 1990 and early 
1991, just as Mate Boban lost it to Bosnia’s Muslims in 1993. The combination 
of malicious information and faulty analysis combined to reinforce ill-consid-
ered decisions taken in haste, including the West’s refusal to use force to end 
the conflicts, the Security Council’s imposition of an arms embargo on all par-
ticipants, and the international community’s determination to contain the kill-
ing and let events run their course, the last a bizarre application of the axiom 
that conflict resolution works best when all sides are exhausted.59 To ratio-
56 Tuđman, Petrinjska 18, p. 194, for politics as an activity only for those who are hard-nosed 
and obstinate. Ivanković, Predsjedniče, pp. 36–7, and 40–1, believes Tuđman was “some sort of 
mix of an ontological pessimist and an existentialist optimist.” (neka vrst mješavine između onto-
lopesimista i egzistencijalnog optimista.) Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, passim, for Tuđman’s repeatedly 
disappointed expectations regarding Germany. For German policy, Sabrina P. Ramet and Letty 
Coffin, “German Foreign Policy Toward the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991–1999,” Problems of 
Post-Communism (January/February 2001), pp. 48–50; Hans Dietrich Genscher, Rebuilding a 
Home Divided (New York: Broadway Books, 1998/1995), pp. 487–518.
57 “Hail, Croatia. With Those words, Germany drags the European Community its way and 
risks a bigger Balkan bust-up,” Economist, December 21, 1991, comments that “it is part of 
Yugoslavia’s tragedy that there is no good policy towards it, only a choice of bad ones.”
58 For a critical assessment of Croatian policy vis-à-vis the UN and the international com-
munity, see Damir Grubiša, “The Peace Agenda in Croatia: the U.N. Peacekeeping Operation 
between Failure and Success,” in Stefano Bianchini and R. C. Nation, The Yugoslav Conflict and 
its Implications for International Relations (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998), passim, esp. pp. 89-
98; for a more complete account, see Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, passim.
59 John A. Vasquez, “Why Global Conflict Resolution is Possible: Meeting the Challenge of 
the New World Order,” in Vasquez, et al., 131, 141, notes that when “Symbolic and transcendent 
stakes” (values and ideology) are at issue, conflicts will tend to be intractable, e.g., “the civil war 
[sic] in Yugoslavia and the ethnic disputes in Armenia and Azerbaijan,” both “intractable strug-
gles of the past.” James Gow, “Nervous Bunnies. The International Community and the Yugoslav 
War of Dissolution,” in Lawrence Freedman, ed., Military Intervention in European Conflicts 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), esp. pp. 25-32. John Hillen, “Superpowers Don’t Do Windows,” in 
Orbis (Spring 1997) 41(2): 251, dismissed Bosnia as a “peripheral, ambiguous and inconclusive” 
security mission because he placed it within a fairly rigid hierarchical security model. For a pro-
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nalize and justify such policies, the West had to believe that Tuđman and the 
Croatians were as bad as Milošević and the Serbians; if they were not, then 
the Western democracies and the UN were complicit in aggression against 
innocent peoples and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not as simple as it 
appeared to be.
But even had Tuđman’s image been better, Croatia’s would still have been 
bad. Radić’s supposedly “erratic” actions during the 1920s had upset histori-
ans like Rothschild, and Ante Pavelić’s Independent State of Croatia, a quisling 
entity, had murdered thousands and provided grist for propaganda mills and 
pundits. Serbian spokesmen and influential journalists, diplomats, and schol-
ars focused the attention of policy-makers and the general public on Croatia’s 
role as an Axis creation and client during World War II, making it difficult 
to see either Tuđman or his country as democratic, but easy to see them as a 
threat to others.60 Foreign observers repeatedly blamed Tuđman and his gov-
ernment for not being sensitive to Croatia’s Serbs and chided both for provok-
ing Bosnia’s Muslims. But the tendency to rationalize Serb and Muslim actions 
by condemning Croat intentions seemed a double standard to Tuđman, who 
had fought Pavelić’s regime during the Second World War, and who com-
plained that the Serbs could do as they pleased in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
because the international community did nothing. The Croats, on the other 
hand, were condemned for helping their cousins there ward off Serb aggres-
sion and then Muslim attacks, despite Tuđman’s conclusion of a military 
accord with the SDA leader, Alija Izetbegović.61
Such complaints, of course, only confirmed the belief in the West that 
Croatia and Tuđman were recalcitrant and dangerous. During the liberal six-
ties, even Croatia’s progressive leaders got bad press in the West.62 Yet it seems 
odd that during a decade enamored of conflict resolution, it did not mat-
ter that Tuđman seemed to be the only leader in the former Yugoslavia who 
was sincerely committed to finding a negotiated settlement.63 Few seemed to 
notice that Tuđman accepted every peace proposal put forward by the West, 
Serbian analysis, Vanni Cappelli, “The Bosnian Question and the Great Powers,” Mediterranean 
Quarterly (Winter 1997) 8(1): 92-114. W. Raymond Duncan and G. Paul Holman, Jr., eds., 
Ethnic Nationalism and Regional Conflict. The Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Boulder: 
Westview, 1994), esp. 19-43, assigned guilt to all parties to the conflict in Yugoslavia, which 
he viewed as both a prototype for future ethnic wars and a lesson in conflict management and 
crisis prevention. Also see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy. Chaos and the Dissolution of 
Yugoslav after the Cold War (Washington DC: Brookings Inst., 1995), who influenced events 
both as a writer and as an adviser to Yasushi Akashi, UN representative in Croatia and Bosnia.
60 For Croatia’s image, see Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, pp. 127-33. For pro-
paganda, see, e.g., www.ihr.org/jhr/v13/v13n4p19_Weber.html for Mark Weber, “Croatia’s 
Leader Denounced as Holocaust Revisionist,” Journal of Historical Review (August, 1993), and 
http://222.mosquitonet.com//prewett/tudjmanscroatia.html, for Christopher Long, “Tudjman’s 
Croatia continues the policy of the fascist Independent State of Croatia (1941–1945).”
61 Franjo Tuđman, press conference, Vjesnik, 6 July 1993.
62 Ante Čuvalo, “Croatian Nationalism and the Croatian National Movement (1966-1972) in 
Anglo-American Publications. A Critical Assessment,” Journal of Croatian Studies (1989).
63 Martin Špegelj to Tarik Kulenović, Ljiljan, June 5, 1996, and Špegelj to Vlado Vurušić, 
Globus, July 2, 1993. Špegelj had argued for military action in 1991–92, but Tuđman favored a 
political-diplomatic solution to the crisis.
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including the Vance Plan to end the war in Croatia in late 1991, the Lisbon 
agreement to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina into cantons mediated by José 
Cutilheiro in 1992, and the Dayton agreements concluded under the aegis of 
the United States in 1995.64 If anyone did notice, they tended to seek ulterior 
motives in his acceptance of the plans, reading dark secrets into state interests. 
In the postmodern world of PR and spin doctors, image always trumps reality, 
particularly when so little is known about the realities under discussion.65
With regard to Yugoslavia, little was available in English because only a 
handful of scholars had studied the country; Eastern European studies had 
been stunted by Soviet studies, the USSR’s colonies and countries in its sphere 
of influence considered less important to Western scholars and policy-makers 
than the communist metropol.66 Unlike Alija Izetbegović, who refused to talk 
to those who had murdered his people, Tuđman talked at length with them; 
he even sent Hrvoje Šarinić to keep in touch with Milošević, and he reminded 
the Muslim leader that if the Croats had not negotiated with the Serbs, peace 
would never have come to Croatia.67 If this practical side of Tuđman was lost 
on most observers, Krsto Cviić believed that many considered him crucial to 
stability in the region precisely because he was cooperative. Tuđman was, as 
Maggie Thatcher once said of Gorbachev, “a man we can do business with.”68 It 
was not necessarily a compliment.
Propaganda
Perhaps the most harm to Tuđman and Croatia in the United States was 
done by the journalist Robert Kaplan, who helped to spread a negative image 
of Tuđman and Croats as vicious anti-Semites through his book Balkan Ghosts 
and his articles in The New Republic. Before the fighting started, Kaplan had 
informed readers of the influential magazine that “racially” Serbs and Croats 
are a single people, but the latter, as Catholics, had been encouraged to despise 
the Serbs and to support “the Nazi puppet state of Croatia,” whose supporters 
killed “more than half a million Serbs.” According to Kaplan, Serbs were never 
64 Tuđman’s efforts to cooperate with international negotiators to end the wars and their 
efforts to use him are clear from the papers collected in B. G. Ramcharan, ed., The International 
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.  Official Papers (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997), 2 Vols.
65 For the power of image and the distortion of reality, see Ewen Stuart, All Consuming Images: 
The Politics of Style in Contemporary Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1984), and Douglas 
Kellner, Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics between the Modern and the 
Postmodern (London: Routledge, 1995).
66 Banac, Protiv straha, p. 233, notes that few knew any Yugoslav history in the West, so it was 
always necessary to begin from the beginning. Banac dismissed the explanatory usefulness of 
concepts like “modernization” and of methodologies based on “social structure.” He believed a 
study of the continuity of Yugoslavia’s “national elites” would be more profitable, with the stress 
on Serbia and its “fears.”
67  See Hrvoje Šarinić, Svi moji tajni pregovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem (Zagreb: Globus, 
1999).
68 Krsto Cvijic, Globus, November 7, 1998. 
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“compensated” for Croatian and Slovenian atrocities against them, but instead 
had seen their “power” “curtailed” in “Communist Yugoslavia.” Tuđman and 
the HDZ were supposedly rabid Catholics, and the Vatican had a “moral reck-
oning” coming which would force it to choose between “Croatian national-
ism” and “Christian unity.”69 Kaplan’s interpretation echoed Yugoslav integral-
ists and he posed a choice as stark as that faced by young Luke Skywalker, who 
had to choose between the Force and the Dark Side. But Kaplan’s analysis was 
shallow and his bias clear; he did not discuss Chetnik or communist atrocities, 
whether in World War II or the early 1990s.
In September 1991, after Serbian forces had overrun Croatian villages and 
murdered or expelled thousands of their inhabitants, Kaplan published a sec-
ond piece with the influential policy journal, in which he insisted that 90 per-
cent of Croatia’s Serbs, who made up 15 percent [sic=11.5 percent] of the pop-
ulation, did not want to be part of a Croatian state whose bars and streets 
were “decidedly Ustashe, with the flags, the eerie war chants, and . . . the ret-
icence of the population and especially the Catholic Church to face square-
ly the record of Croatia’s involvement with the Nazis.”70 In November, as Serb 
forces were dropping as many as 7,000 shells a day on the unfortunate city of 
Vukovar, Kaplan published an article in which he discussed Tuđman’s Bespuća 
and accused him of claiming that Jews were selfish, crafty, unreliable, miser-
ly, and underhanded. So biased was the Croatian leader, Kaplan informed 
his American readers, that he claimed that Jews had participated in the liq-
uidation of Gypsies at the Ustaša concentration camp at Jasenovac. Tuđman, 
Kaplan insisted, was a Holocaust revisionist who wrote a “dense and inflated 
prose” that was essentially anti-Semitic. “You can be sure,” the American jour-
nalist wrote, “that when the Serbian strongman Slobodan Milošević bares his 
soul about the Croats it is no less callous than when Tuđman bares his about 
the Jews.”71 It is not clear how Kaplan knew this, since he did not read Croatian 
and there was no translation the work the journalist was citing, but the essen-
tial relationship was established.72 Tuđman was definitely on the Dark Side 
with Milošević.
Of the two readers whose critical replies to Kaplan were published by The 
New Republic, Malick Ghachem did little to help Tuđman’s image. “What 
Franjo Tudjman’s wacky views about the Holocaust have to do with the current 
situation in Yugoslavia,” he wrote, “is not clear to me, nor does it seem so self-
69 Robert D. Kaplan, “Bloody Balkans,” The New Republic, April 8, 1991.
70 Robert D. Kaplan, “Yugo First,” The New Republic, September 2, 1991.
71 Robert D. Kaplan, “Croatianism,” The New Republic, November 25, 1991. Tuđman cited 
Ante Ciliga, a Croatian communist with Italian citizenship, who noted that Jews were used as 
capos at Jasenovac in his memoir, Svjedok najvećih laži dvadesetog stoljeća. Sam kroz Evropu 
u ratu (1939.–1945.)/ Protiv unitarističkog koncepta jugoslavenske kompartije/ Politička razma-
tranja iz Nove Evrope/Pisma/Testamear (Zagreb; Dora Krupićeva, 2001), pp. 137–215, esp. p. 
175, who claims his experiences at Jasenovac changed his opinion of Jews.
72 Katarina Mijatović’s translation of Franjo Tuđman’s Bespuća povjesne zbiljnosti: Rasprava 
o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1989), Horrors of War: Historical Reality 
and Philosophy (New York: M. Evans, 1996), was not available when Kaplan wrote his articles.
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evident that his ridiculous book helps to explain a war that people in the West 
find so unfathomable.” Like those who believe Croatians have “constructed” 
the “myth” of a Croatian state out of their hatred for Serbians, Ghachem was 
not interested in what Tuđman’s actual views might be; he believed Kaplan. For 
Ghachem, “the Tudjmans and the Miloševićes of the world” were one thing, 
the innocent victims of their vile policies another. The second letter, from 
Katarina Mijatović, the translator who had rendered Bespuća povjesne zbiljnos-
ti: Rasprava o povijesti i filozofiji zlosilja (Wastelands of Historical Reality: A 
Discussion of the History and Philosophy of Aggressive Violence) into English, 
was a detailed, if brief, rebuttal of Kaplan, accusing him of having quoted 
Tuđman out of context and of having attributed quotes from other sources 
to him. She pointed out that Tuđman had cited “numerous sources” and that 
he had concluded that Raul Hilberg’s estimate of five million dead was prob-
ably the most accurate estimate. She noted that Tuđman had not coined the 
term “Judeo-Nazism,” but had quoted an “Israeli professor” (J. Leibowitz) who 
had done so. Nor, she wrote, had Tuđman claimed that Jewish culture was 
responsible for genocide. Kaplan had misquoted him regarding Jews and mis-
represented his position on the concentration camp at Jasenovac. Not only was 
Tuđman not an anti-Semite, Mijatović insisted, but Abraham Foxman, then 
national director of the Anti-Defamation League, and Nenad Porges, presi-
dent of the Jewish Community Council in Zagreb, had both praised him for 
his condemnation of neo-fascism and anti-Semitism.73
In his reply to the letters, Kaplan, who could not read Croatian, acknowl-
edged that he had not read Tuđman’s work, but rather a translation which had 
been used by other journalists. He then implied that Tuđman was a Holocaust 
revisionist because he had recently told Canadian television that he tended to 
agree with scholars who consider the figure of six million Jews who perished 
during the war too high. But Kaplan did not indicate how many Jews Tuđman 
believed had perished, nor the sources he was citing. Nor did Kaplan say that 
the “dense and inflated prose” he had mistaken for Tuđman’s writing was a 
poor translation of a few sections of Tuđman’s massive study, probably done in 
Serbia and certainly calculated to create a negative impression of the Croatian 
leader and his work. Anto Knežević wrote a more detailed rebuttal to Kaplan, 
but it was printed in Zagreb and ignored in the West.74 Nor was Ivo Banac’s 
observation that Kaplan, like Ivo Andrić, purveyed “banal half-truths” wide-
ly cited.75 Bill Clinton and American policy makers, like the American public, 
read Kaplan, not Knežević or Banac.76
73 “Defending Croatia,” letters by Malick W. Ghachem and Katarina Mijatović, The New 
Republic, January 20, 1992. Banac, Protiv straha, pp. 232–3, singled out Kaplan’s piece as an exam-
ple of the media’s penchant for resurrecting hoary (prastare) legends and creating new ones.
74 Anto Knežević, An Analysis of Serbian Propaganda (Zagreb: Domovina TT, 1992), pp. 27–75, 
and Vida Janković and Svetlana Raivcević, “The Master Mind of Today’s Croatia’s Democracy. 
Franjo Tudjman’s Main [sic] Kampf,” posted December 21, 1996.
75 Banac, in Why Bosnia?, pp. 153, 163, notes that Misha Glenny is “not a very reliable report-
er” because he “sticks to the appearance and never delves deeper.”
76 That Kaplan’s book influenced Clinton’s foreign policy had already become a cliche by 1995. 
Even the website for the Simon Weisenthal Centre was inaccurate, as Ton Zwaan, a leader of 
Amsterdam’s Jewish Community noted. Like Kaplan, Zwaan condemned Bespuća without hav-
ing read the book. See Ton Zwaan, Milošević Trial, pp. 31201–3.
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They also read other journalists who echoed Kaplan because they had also 
read the unauthorized ten-page translation of Tuđman’s 400-page book.77 And 
it was clear to them that Croatians as a whole, and Tuđman in particular, tend-
ed to embrace a dangerous neofascist form of nationalism which understand-
ably terrified Croatia’s Serbs. Indeed, Kaplan seems to imply that Catholics as a 
group, and Croatians in particular, tended to despise Serbs and Jews.78 Histories 
of the early 1990s, by definition, could not influence opinions or the course of 
events which they described; they appeared too late in the game. But it is worth 
noting that the German journalist Viktor Meier, who did read Bespuća, does 
not believe that it endorses or advocates genocide; it merely highlights the evil 
associated with genocide.79 Tuđman’s revisionism consists largely in showing 
that humans have had a penchant for killing one another en masse through-
out their history. It is an almost banal observation. Yet in 2003, the Canadian 
journalist Paul Hockenos, whose journalistic account of émigré politics was 
published by Cornell University Press, painted Tuđman as “an apologist for 
the Ustashe’s World War II quisling state” and condemned his books as “ideo-
logically driven tracts intent on exonerating the Croat nation from World War 
II atrocities.” He also, of course, considers Tuđman to have been Milošević’s 
“counterpart.”80 He does not say whether he read Bespuća, Mijatović’s transla-
tion, or the abridged, ten-page Serbian edition. However, neither Daniel Ivin, 
who worked with Tuđman during the 1960s, nor Slavko Letica, who was close 
to him in the 1990s, considers Tuđman to have been anti-Semitic. Although 
Ivin faults Tuđman for his manipulation of history, anti-Semitism, and errors 
of judgment, he concludes that Tuđman himself was not anti-Semitic.81
77 Distortions frequently occur because of poor or tendentious translations, e.g., Mesić 
rejected Milošević’s citations from a speech by Tuđman delivered at Jelačić Square on May 24, 
1992 as a Serbian version, and so inaccurate; see ICTY, Milošević Trial, October 2, 2002, pp. 
10637–8. Even without deliberate distortions, news agencies tended to a national bias; see Mark 
Thompson, Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (London: Article 
19/International Centre against Censorship, May 1994), and Jasmina Kuzmanović, “Media: The 
Extension of Politics by other Means,” in Sabrina Petra Ramet and Ljubiš S. Adamovich, Beyond 
Yugoslavia. Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community (Boulder: Westview, 
1995).
78 In Balkan Ghosts. A Journey through History (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993), Kaplan’s devotes 
most of his section on Croatia to Alojzije Stepinac, Archbishop of Zagreb during the early 1940s, 
whom he portrays as a supporter of Pavelić’s regime.
79 Viktor Meier, Yugoslavia: A History of Its Demise (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 134. For 
some, that Meier is German would disqualify his opinion and perhaps even reinforce the con-
spiracy theory that Germany supported Croatian independence to destroy Yugoslavia. 
80 Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 19, 21, 26, 42, 127, displays a poor grasp of history and accus-
es the Catholic Church of supporting the Ustaša. Hockenos was a journalist and a member of 
the OSCE Mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
81 Daniel Ivin, Interview, Zagreb, September 29, 2005, sees Bespuća as a “stupidity” intended 
to defend Croatia by manipulating history and believes Tuđman needed to jettison his policy of 
“reconciliation” in favor of a sincere apology to the victims of the NDH, both Jews and Serbs. 
Slaven Letica, Interview, Zagreb, June 16, 2005, insists that Tuđman was not an anti-Semite. He 
wanted to rebuild Zagreb’s Synagogue, supported Israeli policy, and sought good relations with 
both Croatia’s Jews and the Israeli state. 
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Nor was Tuđman a rabid Catholic, but the association of the Vatican with 
Croatian nationalism is an old ploy in Yugoslavia. The Serbian press used it 
during the 1920s and 1930s to discredit Stjepan Radić, and the Serbian media 
employed it during the 1990s to discredit Tuđman. In expanded form, it 
included both the Vatican and Catholic countries, whether postwar Austria or 
Fascist Italy.82 Kaplan appears to have merely repackaged what he had gleaned 
from Serbian sources, as, apparently, did Christopher Hitchens, a journalist 
whose “Minority Report” column appeared in The Nation and who wrote for 
The New Statesman and Society. Neither man read Croatian nor Serbian, and 
neither was an expert on Yugoslavia, but both wrote for publications which 
helped to shape the opinions of those on the Left during the 1990s. Hitchens 
conjured up images of Hitler by dubbing Tuđman a “Gauleiter,” and he asso-
ciated him with Milošević by accusing him of cutting a deal with the Serbian 
leader to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina. He paired the Bosnian Croat leader 
Mate Boban and the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić by labeling them 
heirs to the Ustaša and Chetnik traditions, both vicious minions of Tuđman 
and Milošević.83 If not the truth, at least Hitchens had achieved symmetry, 
something highly valued in literary endeavors and conspiracy theories.
Journalists, Scholars, and Diplomats
If Tuđman conspired with Milošević to destroy Yugoslavia, then Serb nation-
alists were born-again Chetniks and Croatian nationalists must be resuscitat-
ed Ustaše. “Many Croats,” a Canadian publication noted in 1994, “point out 
with pride that the Ustashe period (1941–1945) was the only one in modern 
history when Croatia was independent.” Such people, the article explained, 
saw no problem with Croatian symbols like the kuna, a coin depicting a mar-
ten, or the šahovnica, Croatia’s coat-of-arms, but Jewish refugees from Bosnia, 
like Dunja Srajc, found the symbols “disgusting” because the NDH had used 
them.84 Evidently, Ms. Srajc was unaware that the kuna had been a medium 
of exchange in Croatia since the middle ages and that the communist regime, 
82 James J. Sadkovich, Italian Support for Croatian Separatism, 1927-1937 (New York: Garland, 
1987), passim. For a recent effort to link the HDZ and the Catholic hierarchy, see Paul Mojzes, 
ed., Religion and War in Bosnia (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1998) pp. 89–91, who argues, with 
minimum documentation, that Cardinal Kuharić supported both Tuđman and the HDZ, that 
“some” Catholic clergy were extremists, that “Ustashas” dominated in Mostar, and that the struc-
tural identity of “Croatdom” and the Catholic Church coincide. In fact, Kuharić and Catholic 
prelates were generally critical of Croatian policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; see Fra Velimir 
Blažević, ed., Katolička crkva i rat u Bosni i Hercegovini. Dokumenti o stavovima i zauzimanju 
katoličke crkve za mir i poštivanje ljudsih prava i građanskih sloboda i za očuvanje države Bosne i 
Hercegovine (1989-1996) (Sarajevo: Svjetlo Riječi, 1998).
83 Christopher Hitchens, “Minority Report,” The Nation, August 21, 1995, and “Letter from 
America,” New Statesman and Society, August 11, 1995. Drakulić, “A Tudjman Fantasy,” criti-
cized Tuđman as a “commissar,” and Charles Lane and Tom Post, “Bosnia: An Unholy Alliance,” 
Newsweek, July 12, 1993, reported rumors that Tuđman and Milošević had met “in the summer 
of 1991. . .to decide how to carve up Bosnia between them.” Also see Knežević, An Analysis of 
Serbian Propaganda, pp. 75–85, and passim, and Sadkovich, U.S. Media, pp. 226.
84 “Memories of Ustashe,” Canada & World Backgrounder (1994) 60 (1): 13. 
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like the Ustaše, had used the šahovnica, but with a red star rather than the let-
ter “U,” because it had been the symbol of Croatia for centuries. The Republic 
of Croatia kept the crest, but dropped both the star and the letter.85 Yet none of 
this seemed to matter. When constructing parallels, evolving conspiracy theo-
ries, and validating gut feelings, historical fact is trumped by speculation, alle-
gation, myth, and legend, especially if seasoned with moral outrage and hung 
on the right news peg.
Even those who believed that the wars in the former Yugoslavia were the 
result of Serbian aggression saw Tuđman as tending to imitate Milošević, owing 
to the influence of a powerful “Bosnian (or Hezegovinan) Croat lobby” led 
by Gojko Šušak, Croatia’s defense minister. In the autumn of 1993, Chandler 
Rosenberger found Zagreb looking “more like Belgrade” and Croatia’s econo-
my being taken over by a “war mafia,” just as in Serbia. Yet Rosenberger dis-
cerned at least one distinction between Tuđman and Milošević--while Tuđman 
viewed ethnic differences as a historically determined reality that needed to be 
considered to achieve a “historic settlement,” Milošević saw them as pliable 
historical grievances he could exploit to increase his own power.86
If Western journalists tended to pair Tuđman and Milošević, they also 
picked up the themes of Serbian propaganda, not only because the Serbs were 
well-organized, but also because they reflected dominant themes in Yugoslavia 
historiography, which tended to view Croatian politicians, from Radić to 
Tuđman, as separatists opposed to the Yugoslav state, to stress the role of 
Serbs as allies of the West in the world wars, and to highlight Serbian suffer-
ing and to depict Croats as enemy combatants in both conflicts.87 Prestigious 
organizations like the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences repeated these 
themes, myths, and legends, as did respected Serbian journalists and publica-
tions, like the editor of Politika and the Serbian media in general. Ethnic Serbs 
who taught in American universities, like Alex Dragnich, professor emeri-
tus at Vanderbilt and a fellow at the Stanford Research Institute, also repeat-
ed and elaborated these themes,88 as did Gale Stokes, John Lampe, and Joseph 
85 Mate Granić, Vanjski poslovi. Iza kulisa politike (Zagreb: Algoritam, 2005), pp. 105–106, 
defends the coin as a traditional symbol for Croatian money.
86 Chandler Rosenberger, “The Next Balkan War,” National Review, September 6, 1993, and 
“The Tempting of Tudjman,” Report #10, Institute of Current World Affairs, August 1, 1993, for 
concerns in Croatia that Tuđman had given in to the temptation to cooperate with Milošević 
and was consequently turning Croatia into a one-party state.
87 For criticisms of the West for pretending innocence while committing sins of omission, 
see Pavličić, Lament over Europe, passim, and Stjepan Meštrović, ed., The Conceit of Innocence. 
Losing the Conscience of the West in the War against Bosnia (College Station: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1997), esp. pp. 5–34.
88 Dragnich’s work focused on Serbian themes, and his history of the “first” Yugoslavia was 
constructed almost entirely from Serbian sources. His work became less scholarly and more 
argumentative during the 1980s and 1990s, with his Serbs and Croats and his 1991 article in 
Slavic Review effectively defenses of Serbian control of Yugoslavia during most of its history. 
Dimitrije Djordjević, editor of The Creation of Yugoslavia, 1914-1918 (Santa Barbara: Clio, 1980), 
and author of an article on the Ustaša, and Michael B. Petrovich, who translated Milovan Djilas’s 
Conversations with Stalin and wrote the two-volume A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918 
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Rothschild, all well-known and influential academics.89 In his history of post-
1945 East-Central Europe, Joseph Rothschild distinguished the “Croatian 
Spring” from the “Prague Spring” when he portrayed the forces working for 
reform in Croatia during the late 1960s as “emphatically centrifugal, ethnon-
ationalistic, explicitly anti-Serb, and implicitly anti-Yugoslav crypto-separatist 
nonparty forces.”90 Until Tito’s regime began to crumble, even most Croatian 
historians, unlike Franjo Tuđman, followed Belgrade’s lead and accepted an 
interpretation of Croatian history that was highly critical of Croatian nation-
alism and stressed the role played by the Ustaša.91 So it was no surprise that 
Western journalists and politicians, few of whom could read Croatian and most 
of whom had more contacts in Belgrade than in Zagreb, embraced stereotypes 
hostile to Croatia as reliable portrayals of the country and its president. One 
reporter even recommended that foreigners visit the “Genocide Museum” in 
Belgrade to fully understand how Serbs saw the Croatian threat.92
(New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1976), were also ethnic Serbs who also made careers 
in American universities and influenced generations of graduate students. Also influential were 
Stevan K. Pavlowitch, author of various works, including The Improbable Survivor. Yugoslavia 
and its Problems, 1918-1988 (Columbus OH: Ohio State UP, 1988), and Aleksa Djilas, son of 
Milovan Djilas, who wrote The Contested Country. Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 
1919-1953 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1991) and contributed a piece on Yugoslavia to The 
New Republic, “The Nation That Wasn’t,” op. cit. See Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia. 
Search for a Viable Political System (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institute Pr., tline1983), Serbia, Nikola 
Pasić and Yugoslavia (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UP, 1974), Serbs and Croats. The Struggle 
in Yugoslavia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1992); and “The Anatomy of a Myth: 
Serbian Hegemony,” Slavic Review (1991). For critical reviews of Dragnich and Djilas, see James 
J. Sadkovich, “The Contested Country. Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution, 1919-1953, 
by Aleksa Djilas,” Canadian-American Slavic Studies (1993); “Objectivity and Bias: The First 
Yugoslavia, by Alex Dragnich,” Journal of Croatian Studies (1986); and “Serbian Hegemony 
Revisited, or Blaming the Perpetrator, not the Victim,” Association of Croatian Studies Bulletin 
(Oct. 1992) and Journal of Croatian Studies (1993–1994).
89 Gale Stokes teaches at Rice University; John Lampe, a former Foreign Service officer, teach-
es at Maryland. Both men helped to create the Eastern European program at the Wilson Center, 
and Lampe headed it for a number of years. In his From Stalinism to Pluralism, op. cit., Stokes 
includes a section on Serb nationalism, but does not mention Croat nationalism, which he spe-
cifically condemns in The Walls Came Tumbling Down. The Collapse of Communism in Eastern 
Europe (New York: Oxford UP, 1993), pp. 212-213, 218, 227. In Yugoslavia as History, John 
Lampe tends to a view of Yugoslavia’s history which is sympathetic toward Serbs, e.g., by inter-
preting King Alexander as well-intentioned, a view not held by those who the Serbian monarch 
repressed during his dictatorship.
90 Joseph Rothschild, Return to Diversity. A Political History of East Central Europe since World 
War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 186.  Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in 
Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 174, notes the tendence to define Croatian 
nationalism as quasi-fascist.
91 Ivo Banac, “Yugoslavia,” American Historical Review (October 1992), p. 1088; Banac, Protiv 
straha, pp. 245–9, for efforts by Serb propagandists to depict Croats as a “genocidal” people.
92 Everyone, of course, had their sources, and they differed on just about everything, includ-
ing Tuđman, as an American scholar reminded me when she noted that her sources in Zagreb did 
not agree with the impression I had from my sources. For Serbian propaganda, see Knežević, An 
Analysis, and Brad K. Blitz, “Serbia’s War Lobby: Diaspora Groups and Western Elites,” in Stipe 
Meštrović and Thomas Cushman, eds., This Time We Knew. Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia 
(New York UP, 1996). For a Croatian response to the 1986 memorandum by the Serbian Academy 
of Arts and Sciences, see Matthew Meštrović and Radovan Latković, The Croatian Response to the 
Serbian National Program (Saddle River, NJ: The Croatian National Congress, 1988).
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The Serbian strategy of claiming to be the victim while occupying the terri-
tory of their immediate neighbors was unwittingly aided and abetted by those 
Western journalists who implied that the Serbs were both victims and proud 
warriors preempting a very real threat of genocide from Tuđman and his gov-
ernment. The Western media, prompted by Serbian spokesmen, repeatedly 
linked the new Croatian government to the prewar Ustaša movement and the 
World War II state of Croatia. When journalists implied that HOS—a small 
movement of extreme nationalists led by one of Tuđman’s most vehement 
opponents who never polled more than five percent of the vote—was in the 
tradition of the Ustaša, linked to Tuđman and the HDZ, and representative 
of a majority of Croatians, they committed a series of factual errors, but they 
also reinforced the idea that Croatia’s Serbs had to defend themselves against 
a potential Croatian threat that involved not just Tuđman and the HDZ but 
Croatian nationalism in the abstract, whose “essentially fascist” character 
made Croats in the concrete a dangerous group.93 Consequently, reasonable 
Croatian refusals to meet extreme Serbian demands, including their claim to a 
third of Croatia even though they were barely an eighth of its population—and 
the actual rebels a third of that eighth—were represented as Croatian “insensi-
tivity towards legitimate Serb anxieties.”94
When Laura Silber and Allan Little exaggerated the military force avail-
able to the Croatians and Slovenes in 1991, they made it appear that the two 
Yugoslav republics posed a military threat to their neighbors.95 Similarly, Sefer 
93 Sadkovich, The U.S. Media and Yugoslavia, pp.127-33, for the media’s treatment of Croatia 
and Croats. Gale Stokes and Dennison Rusinow both stressed the difference between the “dem-
ocratic” nature of Serbian and the “fascist” character of Croatian nationalism, a notion picked 
up by Susan Woodward and others, who blurred the differences between HOS and the HDZ. 
See Gale Stokes, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down, pp. 212-213, 218, 227. 
94 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, pp. 92-5, 98, and 27, 102, see Milošević, Tuđman, and 
their governments as similar and equally to blame for the conflict. Duncan and Holman, Ethnic 
Nationalism and Regional Conflict, pp. 25-33, equate Tuđman with Milošević, and consider both 
Croats and Bosnians as insufficiently sensitive to Serbian fears of neo-Ustaša and Muslim fun-
damentalism. Woodward, Stokes, and Rusinow adopted similar positions. ICTY, Milošević 
Trial, October 2, 2002, pp. 10648–51, for Milošević’s use of Woodward to argue that Tuđman’s 
government had created a climate of fear, and Mesić’s rejection of his argument. While Mesić 
believed Croatia needed more “rule of law,” he noted that Serbs enjoyed the same civil rights as 
Croatians. In 1998, Croatia’s rating by Freedom House was above that for Serbia, if its image was 
not. See Adrian Karatnycky, et al., eds., Nations in Transit. Civil Society, Democracy and Markets 
in East Central Europe and the Nearby Independent States (Freedom House, 1999). In 1998, 
only one of ten states in this region had a combined rating under two—the Czech Republic. 
Macedonia, Romania, and Slovakia were above 3.0 and Bulgaria just under. Slovenia was rated 
at 2.0, Croatia at 4.25, and Albania at 4.5; both Serbia-Montenegro (Yugoslavia) and Bosnia-
Herzegovina lagged behind, each with a rating of 5.0.
95 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, pp. 114-117, hint that the Croatians are threat-
ening the Serbs, not the other way round, when they write that the JNA was “ready to take on 
the recently-acquired might of the Slovene TO and the Croatian police.” (Emphasis added.) It 
is unlikely that a police force would stand much of a chance against one of Europe’s largest 
and best equipped armies, nor did it. For a more realistic assessment of the opposing forces, 
see Norman Cigar, “The Serbo-Croatian War,” Journal of Strategic Studies (1991-92) and “War 
Termination and Croatia’s War of Independence: Deciding When to Stop,” Journal of Croatian 
studies (1991-92).
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Halilović, leader of the Muslim Patriotic League, inflated the strength of the 
HVO and sought to depict Bosnia’s Croats as neofascists during the conflict 
in Central Bosnia in 1993, an effort aided by Robert Stewart, commander of 
the Britbat component of UNPROFOR.96 So the West saw Tuđman—who 
had called for a liberal society and had opposed both HOS and the reformed 
communist party—as a neofascist, the leader of a garrison state intent on 
dismembering its Bosnian neighbor and eliminating its own Serbian popu-
lation. HOS militants, the armed wing of Dobroslav Paraga’s ulta-national-
ist HSP, were marginalized as neo-Ustaša in Croatia, but they were reborn in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as paladins loyal to Izetbegović who protected Muslims 
from Tuđman’s vicious Croat proteges in the Croatian Defense Council 
(HVO) after having helped the HVO to fend off Serb attacks on both Croat 
and Muslim areas.
The British journalist, Edward Vulliamy, provides textbook examples of 
propaganda techniques, applied to blacken Tuđman, Croatia, and Croats in 
general.97 Even though he noted that “. . .reporters tended to move around 
in their own armoured cars [British Warriors and Scimitars], changing 
completely the nature of our coverage of the war,” he was quite certain that 
Croats were “louts,” “rowdy churls,” and “thugs” (name-calling) who embod-
ied “the brusque bully-boy culture of Herzegovina” (glittering generali-
ties) and sought to create a Greater Croatia by extirpating Muslims from 
Western Herzegovina and Central Bosnia, aided by “Gunter, Manfred and 
Eberhardt,” anti-Semitic recruits for the HVO from Germany, and other 
“mercenaries rallying to Mate Boban’s squalid cause” (association, name-
calling, transfer). Vulliamy reported that “Portraits of Ustasha dictator Ante 
Pavelić” hung everywhere in Grude, the capital of the Croatian Community 
of Herceg-Bosna, which was “a nasty sort of place” and “the mirror-image 
of the Bosnia-Serb state” (transfer). He considered Herzegovina’s Croats 
“clodhoppers,” but in the Croatian town of Široki Brijeg, he saw “pouting 
girls eyeing up loutish soldiers and men dressed in flashy Italian styles.” He 
reported that Croatian soldiers “grunted” and used foul language and “some” 
Croatian children preferred to “offer a Nazi salute.”
Even the Catholic shrine at Međugorje came under fire from Vulliamy, as 
“a base for the imminent ethnic cleansing of the Mostar region,” with “stat-
uettes of the Madonna . . . on sale in trays next to others full of Swastikas, 
96 Sefer Halilović, The Shrewd Strategy (English translation) (Sarajevo: Masal, 1997), passim, 
repeatedly refers to the Croatians as “Ustaša,” but the documents he cites use that term only 
after the ABH attacked the HVO in 1993. Also Robert Stewart, Broken Lives. (London: Harper 
Collins, 1993).
97 For this and the following paragraph, see Ed Vulliamy, Seasons in Hell: Understanding 
Bosnia’s War. New York: St. Martin’s, 1994), pp. 55–63, 209–63, esp. 209, 212, 222–3, 225–6, 
232–3, 237–8, 243, 249, 253, 259, 260, 265. The categories are from E. B. and A. M. Lee, The 
Fine Art of Propaganda (Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1939), cited by Werner J. Severin 
and James W. Tankard, Jr., Communications Theories: Origins, Methods, Uses (New York: 
Longman, 1988), pp. 103-117.
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Maltese Crosses and other Nazi regalia.” According to the British journal-
ist, the HVO absorbed “the fascist HOS” and wore “the uniforms of the offi-
cial Zagreb-sponsored army. . .often adorned by the heraldry of the Third 
Reich” (transfer). But Vulliamy believed most Muslims neither understood 
nor practiced Islam; they were simply the victims of Croat and Serb aggres-
sion their soldiers “boyish” (plain folk), their religious leaders bemused 
that Croats and Serbs were “obsessed” by Muslims and driven to “extermi-
nate” them and their culture, their civilians consumed by a “quiet rage” over 
Croatian aggression, which hurt “far more than what the Serbs are doing” 
(testimonial). Franjo Tuđman, of course, conspired with Slobodan Milošević 
to dismember Bosnia-Herzegovina and recreate a Croatian Banovina, with 
the help of Cyrus Vance and David Owen, whose peace plan, “for reasons 
best known to its architects, played fairy godmother to the Croats, whom it 
treated with illogical and gratuitous magnanimity” (card stacking or slant-
ing; one-sided histories and purposeful selection of data).
Like Kaplan and Vulliamy, Laura Silber and Allan Little, reporters for 
London’s Financial Times and authors of The Death of Yugoslavia, helped to 
create negative images of Tuđman and Croatia. The BBC produced a docu-
mentary of Yugoslavia’s dissolution based on their book, and both book and 
documentary became standard works on Yugoslavia’s dissolution, much as 
Donia and Fine’s short work did with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina.98 The 
language of Silber and Little’s book and the images of the BBC documen-
tary betray a sometimes subtle, but discernable bias. When discussing the 
airing of a KOS film in January 1991 that showed General Martin Špegelj, 
Croatia’s Minister of Defense, purportedly discussing hostile acts against the 
JNA, the British reporters portray the Croat as a peasant with the “face of 
a hardened drinker.”99 Discussing the same incident, Branka Magaš notes 
that Špegelj had joined the Partisans as a teenager, then made a career in the 
Army, rising to command the Fifth Army District, which roughly coincided 
with Croatia and Slovenia. Hardly a Tuđman crony, Špegelj was a member of 
the reformed Croatian Communist Party, and his published work is highly 
98 Silber and Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, pp. 25, 54–5, 92–8, absolved the international 
community of any blame for events in Yugoslavia and appear to admire and commiserate with 
the Serbs; they depict Colonel Vasiljević as a “crack KOS [JNA Counter-Intelligence] agent” 
and the Serbs of the Krajina as proud warriors. Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed (New York: Columbia UP, 1994), passim, portray Tuđman 
and the HDZ as “committed Croatian nationalists” who “abandoned” efforts to deal with 
the Serbs. They see the JNA as having a “proud revolutionary heritage,” think Šušak and the 
“Hercegovinian lobby” influenced Tuđman, accuse the HVO of ethnic cleansing in the sum-
mer of 1992, claim that only Izetbegović wanted peace, and appear to put the destruction of the 
bridge in Mostar “on a par” with repeated shelling of civilians in Dubrovnik.
99 Silber and Little, Death of Yugoslavia, pp. 83, 108-9, 114, seem not to have been bothered 
by the fact that KOS had used a double agent to entrap Špegelj, nor that the quality of the film 
made the subtitles suspect. They consider Milošević “the master tactician” and Tuđman “a gen-
uine nationalist.”
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critical of the HDZ leader.100 In person, he is charming and while critical of 
Tuđman, not condemnatory.101
Silber and Little also use charged language to give the impression that Franjo 
Tuđman was to blame for the breakup of Yugoslavia. On 28 February 1989, 
they write, “. . . Tuđman gave the seething crowds what they wanted: a strong 
dose of nationalism . . . .”102 (Emphasis added.) The image is clear; Tuđman was 
a demagogue, Croatian voters were rabid nationalists. But Tuđman himself 
had been anxious to show that independence was the choice of the Croatian 
people, not something forced on them by the HDZ. That was why, he told the 
journalist Hloverka Novak Srzić, he had called the referendum in 1991.103 His 
party had not won a majority in the elections in 1990, and he had become pres-
ident thanks to a miscalculation by the Croatian communists, who had rigged 
the system to give a majority to whichever party won a plurality, expecting 
that they would be the ones to do so. Instead, the HDZ had swept the boards. 
Tuđman, as Magaš noted, immediately “made conciliatory gestures towards 
Croatia’s Serbs,” including the offer of a vice-presidency for Jovan Rašković, 
leader of the SDS (Serbian Democratic Party – Srpska demokratska stranka). 
But in vain. Letica recalls that during a meeting in 1990, the Croatian President 
repeatedly sought to reassure Rašković, who persisted in raising fears regard-
ing “Ustaša” and refused to work with Tuđman’s government, in part because 
Croatia’s Serbs were certain of support from Belgrade and protection from the 
JNA.104
The BBC displayed bias when it juxtaposed a film clip of Tuđman kissing 
a Croatian flag with another of Pavelić doing so.105 Again the image is clear; 
only Ustaša and neo-fascists kiss flags, so Tuđman was a dangerous national-
ist with neo-fascist tendencies. It was a clever piece of film-making, but hardly 
100 Branka Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia. Tracking the Break-up 1980-92 (New York: 
Verso, 1993), pp. 267-8, also discusses the JNA’s illegal confiscation of the weapons of the local 
Territorial Defense units, noting that the weapons were the legal property of the republics, not 
of the JNA. She insists that, “the difference between legal and illegal has become moot, given 
that republican and Federal authorities (both government and presidency) are all openly violat-
ing the country’s constitution.” Slaven Letica, Obećana zemlja. Politički antimemoari (Rijeka: 
Biblioteka Ex Ungue Leonem, 1992), p. 193-228, discusses the Špegelj incident, as does Martin 
Špegelj, Sjećanje vojnika. (Zagreb: Znanje, 2001).
101 Interview, Martin Špegelj, Zagreb, June, 2005.
102 Silber and Little, Destruction of Yugoslavia, pp. 83-4, and 86, link Tuđman and the HDZ to 
Ante Pavelić and the NDH (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska). 
103 Tuđman to Hloverka Novak Srzić, Danas, February 26, 1993.
104  Magaš, Destruction of Yugoslavia, p. 255, wrote the account in September 1990. Letica, 
Obećana zemlja, pp. 149-62. Jovan Rašković founded the SDS on 17 February 1990. He con-
tacted a colleague in Sarajevo, Radovan Karadžić, to create a Bosnian branch. In 1990, his party 
polled only half of Croatia’s Serbian vote, 6.5% of the total. Rašković was eased out in favor of 
the more militant Milan Babić. See Christopher Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse. Causes, 
Course and Consequences (London: Hurst & Cpy., 1995), pp. 126-7.
105 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, pp. 394–5, also notes that John (Jovan) Zametica, who 
later served as Karadžić’s adviser in Pale, helped to bias the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London, and that the PEW Trust was also biased.
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objective reporting. When Russian television tried something similar a decade 
later, juxtaposing film of the opposition candidate in Ukraine, Yushchenko, 
with footage of Adolf Hitler, Peter Finn promptly denounced the visual ploy 
in the Washington Post, noting that Russian media had been seeking to depict 
Yushchenko as a fascist for months.106 Consciously or not, the BBC had effec-
tively done the same to Tuđman, and by doing so, it had promoted a political 
agenda as certainly as the Russian media had done regarding the Ukraine.
Among the earliest, and therefore most influential, authors to get their views 
about Croatia published was the American diplomat, Warren Zimmermann, 
whose memoir was often cited during the early 1990s and who seems to have 
had a low opinion of most Croats. He criticized Martin Špegelj for associat-
ing with arms dealers and depicted Gojko Šušak as “a Darth-Vader-like indi-
vidual” with links to the Ustaše.  He dismissed Tuđman as an authoritarian 
“martinet” and “an inflexible schoolteacher” who could manage only “a ner-
vous chuckle or a mirthless laugh.” He chided the HDZ leader for ignoring 
his advice to apologize to the Serbs, and he blamed the war on the Croatian 
President’s rejection of “any gesture that smacked of reconciliation, coopera-
tion, or healing,” his “precipitate declaration of independence,” and his failure 
to “assure Croatia’s Serbian citizens that they would be safe in an independent 
Croatia.” For Zimmermann, Croatia was “a republic of lackluster politicians” 
run by the “emigrant-financed HDZ,” which “abused” its Serbian citizens and 
had become a “national security state” with an armed force “larger than the 
armies of Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal, Austria, or Sweden.”107 
Clearly, a major threat to its neighbors, if not to NATO.
The effort to discredit Tuđman was part of a larger campaign to portray 
Croatia as a neo-fascist state and its Croatian citizens as chauvinists who posed 
a threat to minorities within Croatia. This was relatively easy to do because, 
as Tuđman had noted a decade previously, the distortions of Yugoslav histo-
riography had created a “fascist” image of Croatians abroad.108 Like all atroci-
ty propaganda, images were modified and recycled, and the same themes used 
by Serb propagandists in 1990 and 1991 would be adopted by Muslim pro-
pagandists in 1992 and 1993.109 Throughout the decade, journalists, scholars, 
statesmen, and pundits portrayed Tuđman’s government as neofascist, insist-
ed medieval Croatian symbols should no longer be displayed in public, and 
suggested that the Croatian victims of Serbian attacks and ethnic cleansing 
106 Peter Finn, “Old Divisions Resurface in Ukraine,” The Washington Post, November 29, 2004.
107 Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe. Yugoslavia and its Destroyers. America’s 
Last Ambassador Tells What Happened and Why (New York: Time Books/Random House, 1996), 
pp. 15-16, 44, 71-7, 132, 139-40, 151-2, 154, 181. He thought Budimir Lončar “a canny Croatian 
veteran of the Tito era” with a “catlike tread” and a “feline smile,” and Glavaš a Croatian Arkan.
108 Franjo Tuđman, Nationalism in Contemporary Europe (Boulder CO: East European 
Monographs, 1981), p. 164.
109 James Morgan Read, Atrocity Propaganda, 1914-1919 (New Haven CT: Yale UP, 1941), pas-
sim, found that most atrocity stories had a single source, which might repeat the story it had 
originally launched in altered form weeks or months later. Pack journalism makes this easier, 
because a single source can appear as dozens of independently filed stories.
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somehow deserved their fate because they had been insensitive to Serbian 
fears.110 For example, when describing the ambush of Croatian security forces 
in Borovo Selo in May 1991, Donia and Fine blame the Croats for provoking 
the incident and conclude that “the Serbs won handily.” This was an odd way 
to describe the kidnaping, torture, murder, and mutilation of twelve Croatian 
policemen. Yet it was congruent with a point of view that considered Croatians 
and Croatia as essentially fascist and Croatia’s coat of arms as an Ustaša sym-
bol, even if it had been embedded in a mosaic on the roof of St. Mark’s, an 
early modern church in Zagreb’s upper city, for considerably longer than fifty 
years.111 So dominant is the image of Croatia as fascist that James Gow sees the 
mutilation of Croatian policemen by Serbian irregulars as “echoes of Ustasha 
practice in the Second World War,” not as echoes of Chetnik practice.112
Christopher Bennett provides a radically different description of the inci-
dent at Borovo Selo, and a corrective to superficial reporting. He notes that 
the village had been peopled by ethnic Germans until the Partisans expelled 
them after 1945 and Serbs took their place, and he saw “mutilated corpses of 
Croatian policemen” as “the first of a series of premeditated atrocities commit-
ted by Serb irregulars in the summer of 1991.”113 Where Donia and Fine saw a 
defensive reaction by Serbians against a potentially repressive Croatian regime, 
and Gow saw a clever trap of Croats by Serbs, Bennett perceived a pattern of 
Serbian violence against Croats. Which of the three was most accurate? Given 
recent studies by Nikica Barić and Davor Marijan, clearly Bennet.114 But in 
a 1991 report, Helsinki Watch dodged the question, chiding both sides for 
“abuses” against the other, an approach which would be adopted by many in 
the West. Yet Croatian and Serbian abuses were hardly comparable. Croatian 
abuses tended to be instances of workplace discrimination or police brutal-
ity by individuals, while Serbian abuses tended to be organized, systematic 
110 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “Lessons Learned: from Nationalism to State Building after 
Communism,” EES News (January-February 2005), has suggested that the violence in Yugoslavia 
was the result of “fear,” a monocausal and unconvincing explanation of war.
111 Donia and Fine, A Tradition Betrayed, pp. 223-5. The Croatian coat of arms, a check-
erboard or sahovnica, dated from 1582. It was appropriated by the Ustasa, who placed a “U” 
above it. The symbol was then used by Tito’s regime, which put a red star above the checker-
board and surrounded it with sheaves of wheat. See John Kraljic, et al., Croatia and Croats in 
The New York Times (New York: Croatian Anti-Calumny Project, June 1994), p. 24, and Stan 
Granić, “Representations of the Other: The Ustaše and the Demonization of the Croats,” Journal 
of Croatian Studies (1998), pp. 3–56.
112 James Gow, The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries: A Strategy of War Crimes (Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), p. 159, 226–9, argues that the Serbs did not commit 
aggression in Croatia because Tuđman wanted to create a Greater Croatia, making him and the 
Croatian government the aggressors.
113  See Bennett, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse, pp. 164, 62, 161. The expulsion of some 500,000 
ethnic Germans from Yugoslavia after 1945 was generally ignored. But while they lived through-
out Vojvodina and Slavonia, it is not clear whether ethnic Germans lived in Borovo Selo.
114 Nikica Barić, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj 1990.–1995. (Zagreb: Golden marketing-Tehnička 
knjiga, 2005), and Davor Marijan, Bitka za Vukovar (Zagreb: Hrvatski Institut za Povijest, 
2004).
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aggression against villages and towns with the support of the JNA, including 
the murder and expulsion of their occupants.115 Helsinki Watch’s balanced 
approach was misleading in a qualitative sense, and it eroded essential differ-
ences between Croatian and Serbian nationalists and helped to establish the 
pairing of Tuđman and Milošević as similar in their actions and responsibil-
ities. 116
There were also efforts to pair Tuđman with Milan Kučan, Slovenia’s 
President, and blame them for Yugoslavia’s collapse.  In this scenario, Tuđman 
is an epiphenomenon, an accomplice, not a perpetrator.117 However, the evi-
dence suggests that it was Slobodan Milošević and the leadership of Serbia 
and the JNA, not Tuđman and Kučan, who destroyed Yugoslavia. By 1990, 
they had shredded the country’s constitution, staged coups in the autono-
mous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, annexed them to Serbia, and armed 
Croatia’s Serbs. By 1991, they had effectively paralyzed Yugoslavia’s collective 
leadership and were beginning to arm Bosnia’s Serbs.118 As Milošević sought 
to consolidate his control of the federal Presidency, Tuđman joined Kučan to 
propose restructuring Yugoslavia as a confederation. Warning that politicizing 
the JNA and Serbia’s “economic” war against the other republics could “lead 
us to catastrophe,” Tuđman urged Yugoslavia’s republic to adopt the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. By doing so, they would guarantee the equality 
of citizens and an autonomous media in each republic and take a step toward 
confederation. If Serbs in Knin wanted independence, he suggested Albanians 
in Kosovo should be given it as well.  He urged the “revocation of all political 
authority for the JNA,” and he rejected the use of force in favor of incremen-
tal change.119 Strange declarations and proposals for an authoritarian martinet 
conspiring with Milošević and Kučan to destroy Yugoslavia.
As late as June 1991, the Croatian Sabor insisted on “the inalienable and 
non-expendable right of the Croatian nation to self-determination,” but the 
Croatian deputies were prepared to join a confederation of states if certain 
115  Helsinki Watch, Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in the Croatian Conflict, September 
1991, Vol. 3, Issue 14.
116 Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, pp. 18–19, notes that the Serbs had destroyed Serbia well before 
Slovenia and Croatia delivered the coup de grâce in 1991, but the Croatians were blamed for the 
country’s breakup. Ironically, while Slovenia was quickly redefined as Central European, Croatia 
was classified as Balkan, an indication, perhaps, that the Slovenes were more adept at using 
a “Balkan discourse” to distance themselves from South-Eastern Europe, or perhaps a quirk 
in the theory of the Balkan “other” propounded by Maria Todorova and others. See Patrick 
Hyder Patterson, “On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, Austrian, 
and Italian Discourse,” Slavic Review 62 (Spring 2003) 1: 110–41, and Maria Todorova, “The 
Balkans: From Discovery to Invention,” Slavic Review 53 (Summer 1994) 2: 453–82.
117 For a relatively recent apologia for Milošević and a blanket condemnation of Tuđman, 
Kučan, Mirjana Marković, Milošević’s wife, see Slavoljub Djukić, Milošević and Marković. A 
Lust for Power (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), esp. pp. 33, 42–3, 76–79, and 
Mihail Crnobrnja’s Forward.
118 Almond, Europe’s Backyard War, p. 185.
119 “A Proposal by Dr. Tuđman on Establishing Sovereign States,” May, 1991 (facsimile), 
included a vision of a “Europe of regions.”
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conditions were met. Among these were that each state be sovereign and have 
its territorial integrity guaranteed; that minorities be protected; and that secu-
rity be collective. The Croatians also wanted the rights of labor guaranteed, 
property protected according to international law, and attention paid to eco-
logical concerns.120 Those were hardly the demands of a neofascist govern-
ment. Yet throughout the 1990s, Western media continued to depict Tuđman 
and his government as “Ustaša,” even though from August 1991 to August 
1992, Tuđman led a coalition government that included the major opposition 
parties.121 As Serbian forces were occupying Croatian villages and murder-
ing their inhabitants, Gale Stokes, a history professor at Rice, suggested that 
Tuđman and the Croats needed to “atone” for World War II and “apologize” to 
the Serbs.122
Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dum
When Cardinal Kuharić offered reconciliation at the shrine of Marija 
Bistrica, the Croatian prelate observed that, “The winner is the one who 
does not answer evil with evil.”123 But to turn the other cheek in the former 
Yugoslavia in 1991 was to invite disaster, and Tuđman was a political leader, 
not a religious leader. Shaped by his experiences as a Partisan, a Communist, 
a scholar, and a dissident, the middle-aged Tuđman was a patriot who still 
reflected the theories, ideals, and the prejudices of a young man from a small 
town in the Croatian Zagorje. So while he condemned violence, looting, and 
destruction, he warned that the number of dead would multiply if there was no 
peace—a realistic admonition, not a moral injunction by a man who viewed 
reality in geopolitical terms and shaped his policy according to what he per-
ceived as the political, military, and diplomatic realities of the real world, not 
the spiritual realm.
Yet if Tuđman saw himself as the hard-headed father of the contemporary 
Croatian state, he was also the idealistic, and disappointed, child of the for-
mer Yugoslav state.124 Born four years after the creation of the Kingdom of 
the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, he died eight years after Yugoslavia’s disso-
lution. He embodied the ideals and faults of many members of the first gen-
120 Croatian Sabor, “The Resolution on the Procedure of Dissociation,” June, 1991 (facsimile). 
121 Franjo Gregurić, Vlada demokratsog jedinstva Hrvatske 1991.–1992. Milovan Baletić, ed. 
(Zagreb: Naklada Zadro, 1998), passim.
122 Gale Stokes, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down, pp. 212-213, 218, 227. Almond, Europe’s 
Backyard War, p. 230, was one of the few to consider Croatia as democratic.
123 Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 386. Not all idealists are even-handed. The human rights activ-
ist, Aryeh Neier, The Nation, January 9–16, 1995, warned that Croats did not deserve too much 
sympathy because they were fascists, an ideologue’s point of view.
124 Letica, Strašni sud, p. 359, notes that Tuđman believed there would have been no Croatian 
state without him. The role of the individual in shaping events remains debatable. Sidney Hook, 
The Hero in History (Boston, 1954), believed individuals could shape history or be swept along 
on its waves, and Dušan Pavlović, Akteri i modeli. Ogledi o politici u Srbiji pod Miloševićem 
(Belgrade: Samizdat B92, 2001), pp. 7–8, 74–6, 79, 156–7, argues that the 1990s had demonstrat-
ed that structural models are wrong; political actors, not institutions and external conditions, 
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eration of Croatians born and raised in the former Yugoslavia, and he shared 
the ideologies of Croatia’s ruling elite and its dissident intelligentsia. Like 
many Croatians, he fought in the NOP (Narodni oslobodilački pokret, National 
Liberation Movement) and served in the JNA (Jugoslavenska narodna armi-
ja, Yugoslav People’s Army). He was a committed communist and an ardent 
nationalist who sought to rewrite Croatian history from a Croatian point of 
view. But he was neither a fascist nor a radical nationalist. He professed admi-
ration for both the liberal politician Stjepan Radić and the communist litera-
ti August Cesarec and Miroslav Krleža, and during the late 1960s, he was an 
important member of the progressive, socialist reform movement in Croatia. 
Like many Croatians in 1972, he paid a high price for believing in Tito, and 
like most Croatians, he was kept out of public life well into the 1980s.125
Because they have been paired so regularly, Tuđman and Milošević seem to 
be opposite faces of the same authoritarian coin. But Tuđman was as different 
from Milošević as bourgeois nationalism was from bureaucratic socialism.126 
When asked whether he was a Croatian Milošević, Tuđmann responded that 
the Serbian leader was an imperialist, and he was defending Croatia from 
him.127 He could as easily have answered that he was a dissident intellectual 
fascinated by political power, while Milošević was a technocrat obsessed with 
money and power who had made his career in the League of Communists and 
state-run businesses. Even a brief comparison of the two men suggests that 
conspiracy theories which pair them are at best tenuous. 
Tuđman was born in 1922 in the Croatian Zagorje, to a father active in the 
left wing of the Peasant Party. Milošević was born in 1941 in Požarevac, to a 
father who was an Orthodox priest. They belonged to different cultures and 
different generations. With the exception that both lost their parents in trag-
ic circumstances, the events that shaped them, their careers, and their beliefs 
were as different as those of Martin Luther and John Calvin. Tuđman was the 
rare post-communist leader who had actually fought fascism.128 He experi-
enced the German occupation and the repression of Ante Pavelić’s Independent 
establish the direction and course of transitions, making actors like Tuđman and Milošević crit-
ical factors in shaping the events of the 1990s. He also cautions that not all transitions are toward 
democracy. Milošević was able to create a personal regime, whose political philosophy Pavlović 
defines as “sultanism,” because Serbs sees the leader as the guarantor of the state, and Milošević 
showed power, the čvrsta ruka,” strong hand.
125  For a review of biographies on Tuđman, see James J. Sadkovich, “Who Was Franjo 
Tuđman?” East European Politics and Studies 20 (November 2006): 729–39.
126 The difference extended to taste. Lenard J. Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom. The Rise and Fall 
of Slobodan Milošević (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 2002), pp. 155–6, ridicules Šarinić as a snob who 
seems to have preferred “the more elaborate, if rather kitschy, presidential trappings favored by 
his boss in Zagreb” to the plain decor of Milošević’s office.
127 Tuđman, Hrvatska riječ, pp. 81–2.
128 Letica, Strašni sud, pp. 363–4, lists Tuđman’s anti-fascism as one of his virtues, along with 
his scholarship, his willingness to suffer for his convictions, and his success in leading to victo-
ry a state which the “free world” had disarmed. He sees Tuđman as a study in contradiction, a 
nationalist and an internationalist, a communist and an anti-communist, an atheist and a Roman 
Catholic, an elitist and a populist, and a politician who opposed but negotiated with the Serbs.
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State of Croatia (NDH, Nezavisna Država Hrvatska). Milošević grew up in 
Tito’s Yugoslavia under a communist regime which enforced brotherhood 
and unity (bratstvo i jedinstvo). Tuđman was a dissident harassed and jailed 
by the communist regime; Milošević was the protégée of Ivan Stambolić, head 
of the Serbian communist party and one of the most powerful men in Serbia. 
Milošević made a career in the Serbian communist party. Tuđman believed in 
the power of communism, and then of nationalism, to transform Yugoslavia. 
Tuđman was an intellectual and a theorist, Milošević was a technocrat and 
a pragmatist.129 Tuđman wrote books and gathered honors; Milošević made 
money and amassed power.130 Tuđman was a micro-manager; Milošević was 
a CEO.131
If Tuđman was old-fashioned and formal,132 Milošević was postmodern and 
casual. Tuđman could be petulant; Milošević was always amiable. Tuđman was 
paternalistic; Milošević was one of the guys. Milošević was open and easy-
going; Tuđman’s nicknames were Gazda and Ćaća (Boss or Father), Dida 
(Grandpa), and Stari (Old fellow).133 Tuđman was elected President of Croatia 
in a free election; Milošević engineered populist coups in Kosovo, Vojvodina, 
Montenegro, and Serbia. Tuđman trusted General Veljko Kadijević to do the 
right thing; Milošević manipulated the Yugoslav Minister of Defense to create 
a Greater Serbia.134
The litany of differences could go on. Tuđman was a man with a vision, 
Milošević was a tactician. Tuđman was a revolutionary nationalist; Milošević 
sought to preserve and strengthen the status quo. Tuđman sought to seize 
the historical moment; Milošević to exploit it. Tuđman believed in history; 
Milošević believed in power. Tuđman spent years in prison or under house 
arrest; Milošević spent years in the front office and traveling abroad. Tuđman 
was stubborn, proud, and impatient with those who refused to see the truth as 
he saw it; Milošević schmoozed, cajoled, and insinuated. Tuđman saw politics 
129 For Milošević, see Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom, op. cit.; Norman Cigar and Paul Williams, 
War Crimes and Individual Responsibility: A Prima Facie Case for the Indictment of Slobodan 
Milošević (Washington DC: The Balkan Institute, 1996); Sabrina P. Ramet, “Serbia’s Slobodan 
Milošević: A Profile,” Orbis (1991); and Duško Doder and Louis Branson, Milošević. Portrait of 
a Tyrant (New York: The Free Press, 1999). Doder’s bias is clear in “Yugoslavia: New Wars, Old 
Hatreds,” Foreign Affairs 91 (Summer 1993): 3–23, in which he argued that Tuđman “refused 
to disown the fascsit Croatia” [sic] and “instead revived its symbols,” denied Serbs any kind 
of political autonomy,” replaced the Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet, and “purged” Serbs from 
Croatia’s police force. Doder insisted “both sides engaged in ‘ethnic cleansing’,” and he suggested 
the way to end the crisis in 1994 was to give the Serbs ‘a way out with a modicum of dignity.”
130 Letica, Strašni sud, 357, for the awarding of 9 decorations on May 30, 1995, including the 
Supreme Order of King Tomislav for obtaining Croatia’s sovereignty, and the orders of King 
Petar Krešimir IV, Prince Domagoj, Ante Starčević, Stjepan Radić, and Ruđer Bošković.
131 Letica, Strašni sud, 360, and Ivanković, p. 66.
132 Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 108.
133 Ivanković, Predsjedniče, što je ostalo?, p. 11, and passim for Tuđmann’s personality.
134 Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 109
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as a play of particular interests and put his faith in history; Milošević saw pol-
itics as a Machiavellian game and trusted himself.135
In short, Tuđman and Milošević were very different people, and it is diffi-
cult to imagine them conspiring to reconfigure Yugoslavia over the course of 
five turbulent years. Yet many believed, and continue to believe, that they did 
exactly that. Anything seemed possible as Yugoslavia disintegrated, and the 
conspiracy theories and propaganda of the early 1990s have become the basis 
for our current histories of the period. Yet it is hazardous to read too much into 
Tuđman’s efforts to maintain his lines of communications to Milošević during 
the conflicts of the early 1990s. The Croatian leader did so only because his 
study of Yugoslavia’s history, and his personal experiences, convinced him that 
the key to peace and stability on the territories of the former Yugoslavia was an 
agreement between their Croats and Serbs, a conviction shared by an interna-
tional community which repeatedly urged them to collaborate, compromise, 
and strike deals.136 The problem was how to reach such an agreement, and at 
whose cost.
Not only were both men distinct, they espoused ideologies based on con-
flicting premises. As Ivo Banac notes, there were “structural” similarities 
between the Croatian-Serbian clash of the early 1990s and earlier confronta-
tions, because while Serbian nationalists excluded other South Slavs (hence 
their tendency to assert their hegemony) and based their claims on language, 
religion, and the “anti-historical” concept that Serbia existed wherever Serbs 
had settled, Croatian nationalists tended to be inclusive (hence their promo-
tion of Illyrianism and Yugoslavism and Fran Supilo’s distress at Serbian exclu-
sivity) and to ground their claims on historical and “state” rights. So Serbs 
insisted Knin should be part of Serbia because Serbs were a majority there, 
while Croats countered that it must be Croatian because it had been part of 
Croatia since the reign of King Zvonimir. The struggle, therefore, was not 
between Tuđman and Milošević, but between two competing world views 
which were even more intractable than the long-standing disputes between 
Serbs and Croats.137 Tuđman and Milošević simply gave them a contemporary 
form, as do the main characters in any good morality play.
But the characters in a morality play are ideal types created to teach moral 
lessons. They are not real people engaged in the messy business of politics and 
135 Ivanković, Predsjedniče, što je ostalo? pp. 29–32; Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 54, notes that 
Tuđman was overconfident but also quick to bow to pressure.
136 This is the conclusion drawn by Šarinić, Svi moji tajni pregovori, passim, and confirmed 
in the documents of Ramcharan, ed., The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. 
Official Papers, op. cit., passim.
137 Banac, Protiv straha, pp. 118, 123–4; and Michel Roux, Minorité nationale, territoire et 
développement: les Albanais en Yougoslavie (Toulouse: COREP, 1990), p. 404. In Croatia, Serbs 
appealed to their right to self-determination and secession based on demography; in Kosovo, 
they appealed to a variant of historical state right, as Croats had done in Croatia. Serbians saw 
their occupation of Kosovo in 1912 as a reconquest because they had a historical claim on the 
region. Albanians considered it a conquest and claimed it as theirs because they were the major-
ity in the province and the original Illyrian settler, thereby trumping Serbia’s historical claim.
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diplomacy, and they do not belong in historical analysis, except as metaphors. 
To understand Tuđman historically, it is first necessary to understand the real-
ities of the 1990s, not simply cite and repeat the stereotypes, propaganda, and 
moral injunctions of the period. What emerges when we do so is a Tuđman 
whose insistence on the rights of small peoples to create their own states made 
him a villain to some, a patriot to others, and an enigma to most.138 
Patrioten, Kriegsverbrecher und franjo Tuđman
Zusammenfassung
Der Autor geht von den Klischeevorstellungen aus, die Journalisten, ausländische 
Beobachter, Analytiker, Parteichefs, manche Biografen und andere Interessierten als 
Ausgangspunkt benutzen. Er untersucht kritisch diese Stereotypen, um zu substan-
ziellen Informationen zu gelangen, die ermöglichen würden, Franjo Tuđman, den 
ersten Präsidenten der Republik Kroatien als Person, Wissenschaftler und Politiker 
mit mehr Glaubwürdigkeit vorzustellen. Obwohl Tudjman etwa tausend Seiten an 
wissenschaftlichen Texten und anderen Textsorten hinterlassen hat, nehmen das die 
Historiker, insbesondere jugoslawische, aber auch seine Biographen, in erster Linie 
ausländische, nicht ernst. Franjo Tuđman wird fast einseitig als verbissener Nationalist 
dargestellt und seine Politik als ein gefährliches Abenteuer, das jenem von Slobodan 
Milošević gleichzusetzen ist.
Der Verfasser stellt sich nicht mit den Schlussfolgerungen zufrieden, die 
diese Beobachter und Forscher ziehen, sondern er unterwirft sie den kritischen 
Untersuchungen. Er zeigt wie sich ihre Urteile oft auf Klischeevorstellungen gründen, 
die die komplexe Realität auf Koordinaten reduzieren, die einem breiten Lesepublikum 
verständlich sind, das zu diesen Stereotypen neigt. Es ist interessant, dass im kommu-
nistischen Jugoslawien Tuđman Dissident war, wobei  das eine Charakteristik ist, die 
bei anderen Leuten als positiv angenommen wird. 
138 Also see Sadkovich, “Who Was Franjo Tuđman?”,  and “Franjo Tuđman : An Intellectual 
in Politics,” in Sabrina Ramet, Konrad Clewing, and Reneo Lukić, eds., Croatia during the 1990s 
(on press).
